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OFF THE HOOK
Kevin Werbacht
Communications networks are the basic infrastructure of the digital
age. The future of news, business, interaction, entertainment, health care,
education, and many other areas will be built on top of these platforms.
Network infrastructure is the dividing line between the old physical economy
of scarcity and the new information economy of abundance. The legal frame-
work for networks will therefore shape not only the telecommunications busi-
nesses that provide connectivity, but also the applications, services, content,
and user activities that depend on it.
Unfortunately, communications networks are entering a vast legal gray
area. As telecommunications and media converge into the Internet, they are
escaping from the regulatory frameworks of the Communications Act of
1934. In its effort to engage the Internet, the Federal Communications Com-
mission (FCC), the regulatory agency responsible for communications, has
backed its way into a dead-end statutory theory that provides insufficient
basis for effective regulation.
The solution lies within the Communications Act itself, but not where
the FCC and others have been looking. The essential requirement for a flour-
ishing network-infrastructure platform is open interconnection. By locating
its authority to regulate the Internet in its obligations to oversee interconnec-
tion under Title II of the Communications Act, the FCC could reorient com-
munications law for the challenges of a new era.
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INTRODUCTION
Consider the iPhone. An ingenious and wildly successful device,
Apple's iPhone 3G is simultaneously a handheld computer, a Global
Positioning System location sensor, a digital music and video player,
and a platform for tens of thousands of third-party software applica-
tions.1 It is also, as the name suggests, a phone. And that, from a
public-policy standpoint, ought to make all the difference. The
iPhone and devices like it are endpoints of communications networks.
Such networks have been regulated for nearly a century to safeguard
the public interest. Yet today, as telecommunications and media con-
verge into the Internet, networks are becoming a vast legal gray area.
It is unclear, for example, whether the Federal Communications Com-
mission (FCC) can apply its rules mandating open interconnection
and nondiscrimination to the platforms supporting the iPhone ecosys-
tem. And the same analysis applies to any device or service connected
I See Sara Silver, What's in Store: More Companies Are Copying Apple, Offering Software
Programs that You Can Download Directly to Your Cellphone, WALL ST. J., Feb. 17, 2009, at R4.
Since June 2007, customers have purchased roughly twenty million iPhones and
downloaded over 500 million applications. See Posting of Philip Elmer-DeWitt to Fortune
Apple 2.0 Blog, http://apple20.blogs.fortune.cnn.com/2009/03/05/apples-app-store-
25000-apps-and-counting/ (Mar. 5, 2009, 1:51 PM).
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to the Internet-which is, increasingly, all of them. Without a theory
for Internet regulation, both competition and user interests are
imperiled.
A recent example shows the danger of the present course. In a
landmark August 2008 decision, the FCC sanctioned Comcast for dis-
criminating against peer-to-peer file-sharing applications on its broad-
band-access network.2 To justify its legal authority, the FCC relied on
the bold but unfounded discovery of a congressional "national In-
ternet policy"3 in section 230 of the Communications Act of 1934.4
The agency misread its own governing statute, placing the entire ef-
fort in jeopardy. Even if it survives judicial review, the FCC's decision
provides little guidance for future action. This should be a grave con-
cern for anyone who cares about the vast and growing range of activity
that depends on the Internet-from data-enabled mobile phones to
digital-video distribution to smart-grid systems for energy monitoring.
Fortunately, the answer lies within the Communications Act, but
not where everyone has been looking. As this Article will demon-
strate, the FCC has expansive authority over the Internet, pursuant to
the interconnection provisions of Title II of the Act.5 This is an un-
fashionable position. The dominant perspectives in contemporary
communications and cyberlaw scholarship support a limited role for
the FCC, either because the FCC cannot be trusted to regulate wisely,
or because the Commission's legal authority over the Internet is nar-
row.6 Commentators have been content with the notion that Internet-
based services are somehow subject to "ancillary jurisdiction" under
2 See infra Part I.D; see also In re Formal Complaint of Free Press and Pub. Knowledge
Against Comcast Corp. for Secretly Degrading Peer-to-Peer Applications, 23 F.C.C.R.
13,028, 13,028 (2008) (mem. opinion & order) [hereinafter Comcast Order]; Bob Fernan-
dez, FCC Orders Comcast to Change Internet Practices, PHI[A. INQUIRER, Aug. 2, 2008, at CI
("The enforcement action was hailed as a landmark victory by 'net neutrality' advocates for
extending FCC authority to the Internet ....").
3 Comcast Order, supra note 2, at 13,034, para. 13.
4 Communications Act of 1934, § 230(b), 47 U.S.C. § 230(b) (2006).
5 This authority does not mean that the FCC should regulate more aggressively in
every area. On the contrary, giving the FCC a sound basis to address the contemporary
challenges of Internet policy is a way to allow deregulation of many areas in which the
Commission was historically active. See Lawrence Lessig, Reboot the FCC: We'll Stifle the Skypes
and YouTubes of the Future if We Don't Demolish the Regulators that Oversee Our Digital Pipelines,
NEWSWEEK.COM, Dec. 23, 2008, http://www.newsweek.com/id/176809. In spectrum pol-
icy, for example, the FCC should abandon its paternalistic command-and-control licensing
regime for an approach that relies on courts, market transactions, and self-regulatory orga-
nizations. See Kevin Werbach, Supercommons: Toward a Unified Theory of Wireless Communica-
tion, 82 TEX. L. Rxv. 863, 864-87 (2004).
6 See, e.g.,JONATHAN E. NUECHTERLEIN & PHILIPJ. WEISER, DIGITAL CROSSROADS: AMER-
ICAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY IN THE INTERNET AGE 428-29 (2005) (urging the FCC to
practice "regulatory humility" in the face of changes in the marketplace and technology);
Susan P. Crawford, Shortness of Vision: Regulatory Ambition in the Digital Age, 74 FoRDHAM L.
REv. 695, 695-96 (2005).
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the vague and procedural Title I of the Communications Act.7 How-
ever, this approach represents a legal dead end. It cannot support the
needs of a national and global economy increasingly built around the
Internet.
The basic problem with prior theories of Internet regulation is
that they dismiss or ignore the existing statutory framework that dele-
gates authority to the FCC. The Internet was once on the periphery of
the communications industry; it is now at the core.8 It should not be
subject to outdated regulatory restraints, but neither should it forfeit
the protections that an administrative agency affords. Without a legal
basis for the FCC to regulate Internet services, network operators will
have the power to limit innovation that might challenge their tradi-
tional business models. Those who control choke points will be able
to pervert market forces that would otherwise promote competition.
And the opportunity for new communications and media channels to
reinvigorate democratic discourse will be missed. The network of net-
works that we call the Internet is more fragile than it seems.9
Such problems will only worsen. As new platforms such as social
networks and smart mobile devices become ubiquitous, no forum will
be empowered to address the competitive dynamics of standards or
the proper limits on exploitation of user information. We cannot
know what Facebook and YouTube and Skype and Twitter will be-
come, but clearly they and their ilk are what AT&T and radio broad-
7 Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 976
(2005); Crawford, supra note 6, at 728-36; James B. Speta, FCC Authority to Regulate the
Internet: Creating It and Limiting It, 35 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 15, 22 (2003); Philip J. Weiser,
Toward a Next Generation Regulatory Strategy, 35 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 41, 65-84 (2003); seeJim
Chen, The Authority to Regulate Broadband Internet Access over Cable, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
677, 717 (2001); Susan P. Crawford, The Ambulance, the Squad Car, and the Internet, 21 BERKE-
LEY TECH. L.J. 873, 880 (2006) [hereinafter Crawford, Ambulance].
8 See In re IP-Enabled Servs., 19 F.C.C.R. 4863, 4864-68 (Feb. 12, 2004) (notice of
proposed rulemaking) ("[T]he changes wrought by the rise of [Internet-Protocol]-enabled
communications promise to be revolutionary."); Susan P. Crawford, Transporting Communi-
cations, 89 B.U. L. Rtv. 871, 874 (2009);Jonathan Weinberg, The Internet and "Telecommuni-
cations Services," Universal Service Mechanisms, Access Charges, and Other Flotsam of the Regulatory
System, 16 YALE J. ON REG. 211, 211-12 (1999) ("The communications world is changing,
and packet-switched networks are taking over."); Weiser, supra note 7, at 41 ("[T]he advent
of digital, packet-switched broadband networks that carry all forms of communication will
restructure traditional telecommunications markets .... ").
9 See Kevin Werbach, The Centripetal Network: How the Internet Holds Itself Together, and
the Forces Tearing It Apart, 42 U.C. DAVIs L. REv. 343, 346-47 (2008) (applying network-
science research to explain the fragility of the Internet); see also Mark A. Lemley & Law-
rence Lessig, The End of End-to-End: Preserving the Architecture of the Internet in the Broadband
Era, 48 UCLA L. REv. 925 (2001) (expressing concern that gatekeepers will damage the
Internet's innovation-promoting "end-to-end" architecture); Julius Genachowski, Chair-
man, Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, Preserving a Free and Open Internet: A Platform for Inno-
vation, Opportunity, and Prosperity (Sept. 21, 2009), available at http://
www.openinternet.gov/read-speech.html (advocating policies to promote and protect the
open Internet).
[Vol. 95:535
OFF THE HOOK
casters were at the beginning of the twentieth century: the emerging
infrastructure of communication and community for a changing soci-
ety. Neither Congress nor the courts are likely to address all of the
critical issues that these children of broadband networks pose.
A theory of FCC Internet jurisdiction also represents an essential
missing piece in the debate over network-neutrality rules for broad-
band providers. A group of leading policy scholars, including Yochai
Benkler, Lawrence Lessig, Barbara van Schewick, and Jonathan Zit-
train, have advanced powerful arguments for an open, "end-to-end" or
"generative" model of communications systems, which they see repre-
sented in the original implementation of the Internet.10 Nevertheless,
none of them has yet provided the essential legal analysis to ground
open Internet rules in a valid statutory foundation. This Article offers
that foundation.
The arrival of the new presidential administration gives new im-
portance to these questions. President Barack Obama ran on a plat-
form promising to "ensure that these critical communications
pathways [of the Internet] remain accessible to all Americans." 't  He
and Julius Genachowski, the new Chairman of the FCC, support non-
discrimination rules for broadband. 12 Already, the economic stimulus
package enacted by Congress in February 2009 includes seven billion
dollars of funding for broadband infrastructure,' 3 subject to open-ac-
cess requirements to be developed in concert with the FCC.14 The
FCC proposed Open Internet rules in October 200915 and will soon
10 See generally Yociti BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: How SOCIAL PRODUCTION
TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM 29-34 (2006); LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS:
THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A CONNECTED WORLD 34-41 (2001); BARBARA VAN SCHEWICK,
ARCHITECTURE AND INNOVATION: THE ROLE OF THE END-TO-END ARGUMENTS IN THE ORIGI-
NAL INTERNET (forthcoming 2010) (manuscript at 119-55);Jonathan L. Zittrain, The Gener-
ative Internet, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1975, 1975-78 (2006).
11 Barack Obama, Connecting and Empowering All Americans Through Technology
and Innovation, http://www.barackobama.com/pdf/issues/technology/FactSheet_
Innovation-andTechnology.pdf (last visited Jan. 20, 2010).
12 See id. ("Barack Obama supports the basic principle that network providers should
not be allowed to charge fees to privilege the content or applications of some web sites and
Internet applications over others."); see also Posting of Ryan Singel to Wired Epicenter
Blog, Obama Nominates Net Neutrality Backer for FCC Chief http://blog.wired.com/business/
2009/03/obama-nominates.html (Mar. 3, 2009, 4:58 PM) (describing FCC Chairman-des-
ignate Julius Genachowski, who was subsequently confirmed).
13 See Sue Kirchhoff, How Will the $789B Package Affect You ?, USA TODAY, Feb. 13, 2009,
at 3B. Grants for health care, education, energy, and the environment are also tied to
network-based services. See id.
14 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 6001(j),
123 Stat. 115, 515.
15 See In re Preserving the Open Internet and Broadband Industry Practices, 24
F.C.C.R. 13,064 (Oct. 22, 2009) (notice of proposed rulemaking). The Open Internet pro-
ceeding is still in the notice and comment phase. In other words, the FCC has taken no
binding action on this topic since President Obama took office. The FCC's jurisdictional
theory in the Open Internet Notice of Proposed Rulemaking did not significantly deviate
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issue a National Broadband Plan. 16 Classic communications-policy is-
sues of interconnection, universal access, competition, pricing, and
discrimination are bound to generate new debates in light of techno-
logical change. Yet, at least at present, there are no clear answers
about the scope of FCC authority to address them.
This Article develops the core framework to understand the In-
ternet within communications law. Part I explains how Internet-based
services have been handled by the FCC to date. It traces the develop-
ment of the "information services" category and summarizes the
FCC's effort to fashion rules for broadband-access providers in its re-
cent decision regarding Comcast's broadband-network management
practices. Part II attacks the FCC's reasoning. It shows how the FCC
decision misread the Telecommunications Act of 1996 and suffered
from procedural flaws, undermining the entire project. Part III pro-
vides a new interpretation of the FCC's ancillary jurisdiction to over-
see Internet-based communications platforms. It explains how the
central policy mandates of Title II of the Telecommunications Act can
be effectuated only through application to Internet services.
I
THE PHANTOM NATIONAL INTERNET POLICY
The FCC is an independent regulatory agency established during
the New Deal to oversee telephone and radio services. 17 Today, its
jurisdiction covers a broad collection of major industries, including
broadcasting, telephone service, mobile phones, satellite communica-
tions, and cable television. 18 The FCC oversees universal-service fund-
ing mechanisms, content regulation, and other mechanisms with
significant impacts in shaping mass culture. 19 The agency's authoriz-
ing statute, the Communications Act of 1934,20 was substantially over-
hauled by the Telecommunications Act of 1996.21
from the one described herein. See id. at 13,099. Pending litigation in response to the
Comcast Order, as described infra at Part I.D, may well change the legal context of the pro-
ceeding. For these reasons, this article takes the Comcast Order as the last definite FCC
position on the scope of Internet regulation.
16 See Press Release, Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, FCC Launches Development of Na-
tional Broadband Plan (April 8, 2009), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/
attachmatch/DOC-289900A1 .pdf.
17 See Kevin Werbach, The Federal Computer Commission, 84 N.C. L. REv 1, 3, 14 (2005).
18 See PETER W. HUBER ET AL., FEDERAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAw 209-11, 220-21 (2d
ed. 1999); NUECHITERLEIN & WEISER, supra note 6, at 146.
19 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (2006) (proscribing indecent or obscene content in
broadcasting); 47 U.S.C. § 254 (2006) (regarding universal service).
20 Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064, 1064 (codified as amended at
47 U.S.C. § 151).
21 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 509, 110 Stat. 56, 137
(codified at 47 U.S.C. § 203).
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Like any administrative agency, the FCC is technically a creature
of Congress. 22 It can interpret congressional mandates but may not
go beyond them. The scope of agency authority thus becomes a ques-
tion when new technologies develop that Congress did not contem-
plate. The Internet is a perfect example.
A. The Rise of Information Services
From the communications-policy perspective, the Internet is a
rather odd duck. It demonstrably involves "interstate and foreign
communication by wire or radio," 23 the touchstone for FCC jurisdic-
tion. It uses facilities of all major types of regulated communications
providers, including telecommunications carriers, cable television op-
erators, broadcasters, wireless operators, and satellite providers. 24 It
also delivers services that mimic and compete with those of the regu-
lated providers, including voice-over Internet protocol (VoIP) phone
service 25 and video programming. 26 And yet the Internet is somehow
part of the entire regulated communications world while standing
outside of it.
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 distinguishes between
"telecommunications" and "information services." 27 "Telecommuni-
cations" means "transmission, between or among points specified by
the user, of information of the user's choosing, without change in the
form or content of the information as sent and received." 28 In other
words, telecommunications involve an unaltered communications
pipe, analogous to traditional voice telephone service. 29 "Information
service" means "the offering of a capability for generating, acquiring,
storing, transforming, processing, retrieving, utilizing, or making
available information via telecommunications."3 0 In other words, in-
formation service involves some computer processing that acts upon
22 See Crawford, supra note 6, at 728-36.
23 47 U.S.C. § 152(a).
24 See In re Fed.-State Joint Bd. on Universal Serv., Report to Cong., 13 F.C.C.R.
11,501, 11,531-32 (1998), available at http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Common-Carrier/
Reports/fcc98067.pdf [hereinafter Stevens Report].
25 See id. at 11,541-45; In re IP-Enabled Servs. and E911 Requirements for IP-Enabled
Serv. Providers, 20 F.C.C.R. 10,245, 10,290 (May 19, 2005) (first report & order & notice of
proposed rulemaking).
26 See Kevin Werbach, The Implications of Video Peer-to-Peer on Network Usage, in PEER TO
PEER VIDEO: THE ECONOMICS, POLICY, AND CULTURE OF TODAY'S NEW MASS MEDIUM 95, 98
(Eli M. Noam & Lorenzo Maria Pupillo eds., 2008).
27 See Weinberg, supra note 8, at 222.
28 47 U.S.C. § 153(43).
29 See Weinberg, supra note 8, at 222. In reality, voice calls may involve protocol con-
versions and other technical manipulations, but these are not visible to the user. More-
over, there is no net change in the kind of information put into and taken out of the
network. Voice goes in, voice comes out.
30 47 U.S.C. § 153(20).
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the content transmitted across the network. Internet-based services
are generally understood to be information services.31
The telecommunications/information services distinction, added
in the Telecommunications Act of 1996, codified an earlier FCC-de-
veloped division between basic and enhanced services. 32 In its Com-
puter Inquiry decisions between the late 1960s and the early 1990s, the
FCC wrestled with the treatment of data-processing services that inter-
acted with the telephone network.33 For most of that time, telephone
service was provided primarily by AT&T and other heavily regulated
monopolies. 34 In the Computer Inquiries, the FCC had to consider both
how to treat new data-processing services, such as voicemail and elec-
tronic data links between companies, as well as whether AT&T and
other local monopolies could compete in those markets. 3 5
The Commission created a distinction between basic services,
which were traditional, regulated transmission offerings, and en-
hanced services, a new invention.3 6 The basic/enhanced framework
was a simple two-layer model: basic service underneath and enhanced
services on top. The Commission considered providers of enhanced
services users of the network and therefore not subject to regulation. 37
These providers purchased capacity and features from AT&T under
the same tariffs as businesses. 38 The Commission limited the ability of
AT&T and its successor companies to offer enhanced services, so they
31 See Rob Frieden, The FCC's Name Game: How Shifting Regulatory Classifications Affect
Competition, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1275, 1286-87 (2004); Jason Oxman, The FCC and the
Unregulation of the Internet 11 n.27 (Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n Office of Plans & Policy, Work-
ing Paper No. 31, 1999), available at http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/OPP/working-papers/
oppwp3l.pdf.
32 See In re Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wire-
line Facilities, 20 F.C.C.R. 14,853, 14,871, para. 29 (Aug. 5, 2005) (report & order & notice
of proposed rulemaking) [hereinafter Wireline Broadband Order] ("[T]he Commission
has previously determined that Congress intended the statutory categories [of information
service and telecommunications service] to parallel the categories [of enhanced service
and basic service that] the Commission established in the Computer Inquiry proceeding.");
Robert Cannon, The Legacy of the Federal Communications Commission's Computer Inquiries, 55
FED. COMM. L.J. 167, 191-92 (2003) (explaining that the terms "telecommunications" and
"information services" formalize the distinction between basic and enhanced services).
33 See Cannon, supra note 32, at 173; see also In re Computer III Further Remand Pro-
ceedings: Bell Operating Co. Provision of Enhanced Servs., 10 F.C.C.R. 8360, 8362-69
(Feb. 7, 1995) (notice of proposed rulemaking) (recounting the history of the Computer
Inquiries); In re Regulatory & Policy Problems Presented by the Interdependence of Com-
puter & Commc'n Servs. & Facilities, 7 F.C.C.2d 11, 13-16 (1966) (notice of inquiry).
34 See NUECHTERLEIN & WEISER, supra note 6, at 55.
35 See Cannon, supra note 32, at 168-69.
36 See Kevin Werbach, Breaking the Ice: Rethinking Telecommunications Law for the Digital
Age, 4J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 59, 84 (2005).
37 See Cannon, supra note 32, at 188.
38 See Robert Cannon, Where Internet Service Providers and Telephone Companies Compete: A
Guide to the Computer Inquiries, Enhanced Service Providers and Information Service Providers, 9
CoMMLAw CONSPECTUS 49, 56 (2001).
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would not snuff out new services that depended on their underlying
transmission capabilities. 39 The basic/enhanced distinction became a
sort of shorthand for regulated versus unregulated services. 40 This
concept largely survived in the 1996 Act.
Generally speaking, the regulatory commands of Title II of the
Act apply to providers of telecommunications services. 41 The Act de-
fines information services, but it does not impose particular mandates
on them. The FCC has interpreted the statutory provisions of the Act
as a mandate to continue its prior practice of treating information-
service providers as unregulated users of the network.42 In the initial
years after the passage of the 1996 Act, the telecommunications/infor-
mation services distinction came up primarily in connection with new
entrants. VoIP providers such as Vonage offered services that strongly
resembled regulated telecommunications services, but they did so us-
ing technologies that fit within the definition of information ser-
vices.43 In a 1998 report to Congress 44 and a 2004 declaratory
ruling,45 the FCC outlined its approach to VoIP services. The Com-
mission generally avoided treating as telecommunications any offer-
ing that did not exactly mimic classic telephone service. 46
The issue before the Commission in these early decisions was
whether an information-service provider could be found to engage in
telecommunications; the issue was not whether telecommunications-
service providers could be classified as offering information services.
Although the possibility existed that incumbent operators could
switch to Internet-protocol-based transmission, the FCC did not con-
sider this possibility a serious threat to the regulatory structure. 47
When AT&T tried to avoid regulated "access charges" by routing some
of its voice backbone traffic through an Internet protocol (IP) link,
the FCC rebuked the company.48
39 See Cannon, supra note 32, at 184.
40 See Cannon, supra note 38, at 50.
41 See NUECHTERLEIN & WEISER, supra note 6, at 217.
42 See sources cited supra note 32.
43 Vonage Holdings Corp. v. Minn. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 290 F. Supp. 2d 993, 999 (D.
Minn. 2003); Sunny Lu, Cellco Partnership v. FCC &Vonage Holdings Corp. v. Minnesota
Public Utilities Commission: VoIP's Shifting Legal and Political Landscape, 20 BERKELEY TEcFI.
L.J. 859, 860 (2005).
44 See Stevens Report, supra note 24, at 11,541-45.
45 In re Petition for Declaratory Ruling that Pulvercom's Free World Dialup Is
Neither Telecomms. Nor a Telecomms. Serv., 19 F.C.C.R. 3307, 3312-24 (2004) (mem.
opinion & order).
46 See id. at 3312-14. However, the Commission did impose some "social polic[y]"
obligations, such as 911 emergency service and law-enforcement access on VoIP providers.
Crawford, Ambulance, supra note 7, at 874.
47 See Cannon, supra note 38, at 53-56.
48 See In re Petition for Declaratory Ruling that AT&T's Phone-to-Phone IP Telephony
Servs. Are Exempt from Access Charges, 19 F.C.C.R. 7457, 7465-68 (2004) (order) [here-
inafter Petition for Declaratory Ruling]. This was AT&T the postdivestiture, long-distance
2010] 543
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And then, something funny happened: the biggest providers of
regulated telecommunications services became the biggest providers
of unregulated broadband access. 49 The major network operators
largely missed the initial wave of the Internet, ceding to stand-alone
Internet-service providers (ISPs) such as AOL and Earthlink the lead-
ing position in the dial-up Internet-access market.50 Dial-up Internet
traffic passes through the telephone network like voice or fax calls.
High-speed broadband connections, on the other hand, involve end-
to-end data transmission. The cable industry was the first to deploy
broadband aggressively. 51 Cable was not subject to the common-car-
riage requirements of Title II. The cable industry developed its cable-
modem networks as closed systems, rejecting calls to offer access to
independent ISPs. 52 Telephone companies initially had to offer un-
bundled access to their competing digital-subscriber-line (DSL) net-
works under the infrastructure-sharing rules of the 1996 Act.
53
Faced with a choice between expanding or reducing the scope of
open-access mandates, the Republican-led FCC during the Bush Ad-
ministration chose to cut back on regulation. The Commission deter-
mined that broadband offerings of both cable and DSL providers, as
well as other similar services, were indivisible information services. 54
The FCC rejected the claim that network operators should always have
to provide a regulated telecommunications service as distinct from the
higher-level information service they offer to their customers. 55 From
that point on, network operators providing broadband access were in-
formation-service providers.
carrier, not the local incumbent carrier that purchased the former carrier and subse-
quently took its name.
49 See Susan P. Crawford, The Internet and the Project of Communications Law, 55 UCLA L.
REV. 359, 401 (2007) ("In general, Internet access infrastructure is dominated in the west
by AT&T and in the east by Verizon, with cable companies Comcast and Time Warner
operating nationally.").
50 This was partly due to the pre-1996 Act's restrictions on the Bell Operating Compa-
nies' carrying traffic across local-exchange boundaries, which were still in effect.
51 See Lemley & Lessig, supra note 9, at 928-29; see also Kevin Werbach, The Architecture
of Internet 2.0, RELEASE 1.0, Feb. 19, 1999, available at http://downloads.oreilly.com/radar/
rl/02-99.pdf (noting that cable companies were starting to provide commercial high-speed
access).
52 See Lemley & Lessig, supra note 9, at 927; Werbach, supra note 51, at 4-5 (explain-
ing that cable operators enter into exclusive arrangements with affiliated service providers
so that customers in those areas "cannot use independent ISPs").
53 See Lemley & Lessig, supra note 9, at 927-28.
54 See Wireline Broadband Order, supra note 32, at 14,909-11; In re Inquiry Concern-
ing High-Speed Access to the Internet over Cable & Other Facilities, 17 F.C.C.R. 4798,
4839 (Mar. 14, 2002) (declaratory ruling & notice of proposed rulemaking) (determining
that cable-modem service is properly classified as an information service); Kevin Werbach,
Only Connect, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1233, 1268 (2008).
55 See Wireline Broadband Order, supra note 32, at 14,858.
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The Supreme Court ratified the FCC's decision in National Cable
& Telecommunications Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Services.5 6 Subsequently,
in Pacific Bell Telephone Co. v. Linkline Communications, Inc.,57 the Court
rejected the use of antitrust claims to gain unbundled access to the
telecommunications component of those broadband-information ser-
vices and acknowledged the Commission's finding of robust competi-
tion between cable-modem and DSL services.
The FCC's caveat for its broadband-reclassification decisions was
that information services are not entirely without regulatory obliga-
tions. In addition to the specific mandates of Title II, the Commission
has general housekeeping authority under Title I of the Act. In the-
ory, that authority could be used to fashion a new set of rules for infor-
mation services. Obligations that would apply to Internet-based
services are therefore generally labeled "Title I" mandates. 58 The con-
cept of Title I regulation, however, is quite vague today.59 The FCC
and the courts have asserted that the FCC could establish some rules
for information services. The boundaries for such action must be
determined. 60
B. The Open-Access Movement and Network Neutrality
As the FCC was considering the proper treatment of Internet-
based services, a collection of academics made the case for open In-
ternet as a goal of communications policy. "Infrastructure-oriented"
communications-policy scholars, including Benkler, Susan Crawford,
Brett Frischmann, van Schewick, and Zittrain, articulated rationales
for the unique potential of the Internet.6 1 These academics generally
reject Chicago-School economic arguments for treating network oper-
ators like any other business. Instead of the old, vague notions that
56 545 U.S. 967, 1002-03 (2005).
57 No. 07-512, slip op. at 1-5 (Feb. 25, 2009).
58 See NUECHTERLEIN & WEISER, supra note 6, at 213-16. In Brand X the Supreme
Court recognized the FCC's power to regulate information-service providers under Title 1.
See Brand X, 545 U.S. at 976.
59 NUECHTERLEIN & WEISER, supra note 6, at 218 ("To say that a given communications
technology... should be regulated under Title I is to embrace two conclusions. The first
is that the service in question slips through the cracks of the substantive titles of the Com-
munications Act (II, III, and VI), and is thus immune from the industry-specific regulations
contained in those titles. The second is that the FCC has broad discretion to regulate or
deregulate the service as it sees fit ... .
60 See id. at 218-21.
61 See BENKLER, supra note 10, at 168-79; VAN SCHEWICK, supra note 10, at 1-2; Yochai
Benkler, From Consumers to Users: Shifting the Deeper Structures of Regulation Toward Sustainable
Commons and User Access, 52 FED. COMM. LJ. 561, 579 (2000) [hereinafter Benkler, Consum-
ers to Users]; Crawford, supra note 49, at 390; Brett M. Frischmann, An Economic Theory of
Infrastructure and Commons Management, 89 MINN. L. REV. 917, 1004-22 (2005); Zittrain,
supra note 10, at 1987-94.
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certain industries were "'affected with the public interest"' 62 or sub-
ject to regulation solely based on their size and influence, these schol-
ars define a class of infrastructure that forms the platform for an array
of other activities.63 Drawing on newer literatures in common-pool
resources and complexity theory, the approach seeks to legitimize in-
frastructure within the framework of neoclassical economics while also
drawing on communitarian and related theories of political
economy.64
Crawford, for example, argues that the Internet represents a new
kind of complex system, radically different from the static communi-
cations networks that the FCC historically regulated. 65 She worries
that expansion of FCC authority over Internet-based communications
is a form of regulatory "capture" by incumbent operators who seek to
force the new technology to compete on their old, tilted playing
field.66 A key conclusion of this approach is that the infrastructure
must be open to uncontrolled innovation. 67 Those who build net-
works should not be given total control over the activity on those net-
works, because their own incentives are too narrow to encompass the
full welfare calculus of the ecosystem built around their platform. 68
Under the "layered model" of communications systems, networks
are divided into conceptual stacks of functional layers. 69 Physical con-
nections, such as wires, switches, and wireless links, make up the bot-
tom layer.70 Software-based systems to route information and to
deliver applications exist at a higher level, with content sitting on top
of them.71 Data networks such as the Internet are designed to sepa-
rate these layers through modular design and standards-based inter-
62 Frischmann, supra note 61, at 963 (quoting RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, PRINCIPLES FOR A
FREE SOCIETY: RECONCILING INDIVIDUAL LIBERTY WITH THE COMMON GOOD 279-318 (1998)).
63 See id. at 1004-22.
64 See Crawford, supra note 49, at 390-94.
65 See id. at 388-91; see also David Isenberg, Rise of the Stupid Network, http://
www.rageboy.com/stupidnet.html (last visited Jan. 20, 2010).
66 See Crawford, Ambulance, supra note 7, at 925 ("The delegation by Congress of
broad power over communications to an independent, unaccountable 'expert' agency is,
in this age of convergence, leading to a situation in which the capture of 'new technology'
rulemakings by 'old technology' companies and interests is very likely.").
67 See Frischmann, supra note 61, at 1022.
68 See id. at 929-31 (arguing that focusing exclusively on supply-side issues yields an
incomplete analysis because it fails to account for the social benefits of open access).
69 Lawrence B. Solum & Minn Chung, The Layers Principle: Internet Architecture and the
Law, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 815, 816 (2004); Werbach, supra note 36, at 71-74; Kevin
Werbach, A Layered Model for Internet Policy, I J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH-TECH L. 37, 57-64
(2002) [hereinafter Werbach, Layered Model]; Richard S. Whitt, A Horizontal Leap Forward:
Formulating a New Communications Public Policy Framework Based on the Network Layers Model,
56 FED. COMM. L.J. 587, 592-93 (2004).
70 See Werbach, Layered Model supra note 69, at 60.
71 See id. at 61-64.
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faces. 72 This design allows one physical network to carry many
different applications. It also means that third parties, including ser-
vice providers, content providers, and even users, can interact at the
higher levels of the network without involving the lower layers. 73
Infrastructure scholars generally favor separation of the In-
ternet's application and content layers from the regulated physical
layer of communications networks.7 4 The only way to keep incumbent
operators and incumbent regulators from corrupting the Internet, on
this theory, is to quarantine it. 75 These scholars tend to be skeptical of
the ability of regulators such as the FCC to manage the issues that
arise at the interfaces between networks and applications. 76 These
scholars prefer the more drastic solution of barring network operators
from competing at the higher levels of the system. 77
The FCC mandated separation in its Computer II and Computer III
decisions. 78 In its Computer II decision, the FCC barred AT&T and the
successor Bell Operating Companies from offering integrated en-
hanced services. 79 The Commission moved away from this tack after
the passage of the 1996 Act. The FCC recognized that network opera-
tors could gain efficiencies from delivering information services that
integrated with their network platforms.8 0 Allowing integrated infor-
mation services was also a way to incentivize telephone companies to
invest in the significant network upgrades required to support broad-
band Internet access.8 1 Because cable operators, the major broad-
band competition for telephone companies, were never subject to the
Computer Inquiry restrictions, eliminating them was seen as leveling the
competitive playing field. 82 The Commission believed that new com-
petition would provide sufficient discipline to prevent abuses by net-
work operators.8 3
72 SeeJoseph Farrell & Philip J. Weiser, Modularity, Vertical Integration, and Open Access
Policies: Towards a Convergence of Antitrust and Regulation in the Internet Age, 17 HARV. J.L. &
TECH. 85, 95-96 (2003).
73 See Werbach, supra note 36, at 66-67.
74 See Crawford, supra note 8, at 927.
75 See id. at 928.
76 See id. at 927.
77 See Crawford, Ambulance, supra note 7, at 923-38.
78 See In re Amendment of Section 64.702 of the Comm'n's Rules & Regulations (Sec-
ond Computer Inquiry), 77 F.C.C.2d 384, 474-75 (1980) (final decision) [hereinafter Com-
puter I1]; In reAmendment of Sections 64.702 of the Comm'n's Rules & Regulations (Third
Computer Inquiry), 104 F.C.C.2d 958 (1986) (report & order) [hereinafter Computer II1].
79 See Computer II, supra note 78, at 388-89.
80 See Computer III, supra note 78, at 1002-03.
81 See Wireline Broadband Order, supra note 32, at 14,865.
82 See id. at 14,856, para. 2.
83 See Lemley & Lessig, supra note 9, at 951-52; Werbach, supra note 54, at 1255.
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As an alternative to mandatory separation, open-Internet propo-
nents coalesced around the concept of network neutrality.8 4 The ba-
sic concept of network neutrality is that network operators should not
disadvantage unaffiliated providers of applications or content.8 5 Van
Schewick has explained in detail how this approach reflects the "end-
to-end" architecture of the original Internet.8 6 Other network-neu-
trality champions such as Tim Wu and Lessig situated the approach
within the history of communications policy.8 7 They argue that net-
work neutrality represents an extension of common carriage, the
long-established doctrine that telephone companies and certain other
businesses must be a neutral-service platform for all customers.8 8
On this view, government rules expressly prevented network op-
erators from discriminating against users of their networks from the
nineteenth-century precursors of the Communications Act until Brand
X Wu has made the case that Carterfone, the 1968 FCC decision bar-
ring AT&T from controlling what devices connected to the telephone
network, reflects the same policy of regulating network operators to
promote competition and innovation at higher layers.89 To network-
neutrality advocates, therefore, the Internet represents the fullest ex-
pression of policy goals articulated in the Communications Act and
celebrated FCC decisions. 90
A problem with network neutrality is that it lacks purchase within
the statutory apparatus. 91 As a high-level matter, a requirement that
84 See Brett M. Frischmann & Barbara van Schewick, Network Neutrality and the Econom-
ics of an Information Superhighway: A Reply to Professor Yoo, 47 JURIMETRICS J. 383, 384-89
(2007); Barbara van Schewick, Towards an Economic Framework for Network Neutrality Regula-
tion, 5 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 329, 331-34 (2007); Tim Wu, The Broadband
Debate, A User's Guide, 3 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 69, 88-90 (2004); Tim Wu,
Network Neutrality, Broadband Discrimination, 2 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 141,
142-44 (2003) [hereinafter Wu, Network Neutrality].
85 See van Schewick, supra note 84, at 333; Wu, Network Neutrality, supra note 84, at
142-43.
86 See VAN SCHEWICK, supra note 10, at 491-95, 564-65. For a description of the "end-
to-end" design of the original Internet, seeJ.H. Saltzer et al., End-to-End Arguments in System
Design, 2 ACM TRANSACTIONS ON COMPUTER SVs. 277 (1984).
87 See Ex parte letter from Tim Wu, Assoc. Professor, Univ. of Va. Sch. of Law, &
Lawrence Lessig, Professor of Law, Stanford Law Sch., to Marlene H. Dortch, Sec'y, Fed.
Commc'ns Comm'n (Aug. 22, 2003), available at http://fallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs2/document/
view?id=6514683885.
88 See id, at 12.
89 Tim Wu, Wireless Carterfone, 1 INT'LJ. COMM. 389, 396-97 (2007).
90 Letter from Tim Wu & Lawrence Lessig to Marlene H. Dortch, supra note 87, at
10-12. Phil Weiser offers a related set of arguments for applying traditional intellectual-
property and antitrust theory to the Internet. See Philip J. Weiser, The Internet, Innovation,
and Intellectual Property Policy, 103 COLUM. L. REv. 534, 550-52 (2003).
91 See infra Part II. There are other objections to network-neutrality rules, including
concerns that they stifle investment in networks and prevent efficient congestion manage-
ment. See C. Scott Hemphill, Network Neutrality and the False Promise of Zero-Price Regulation,
25 YALE J. ON REG. 135, 148-51 (2008); Christopher S. Yoo, Beyond Network Neutrality, 19
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Verizon Wireless provide nondiscriminatory interfaces for mobile
phones parallels a requirement that AT&T provide nondiscriminatory
interfaces for landline phones. However, the Internet is not just a
device that hangs off the end of the network. It is the network. In-
ternet-based services directly overlap with and sometimes compete
with regulated communications offerings. Most seriously from a legal
standpoint, this arrangement means that the network-platform owners
can themselves become Internet-based providers.
According to the FCC, Comcast, when offering its cable-modem
service, is an information-service provider.92 Regulating Comcast's
broadband service is therefore tantamount to regulating the
Carterfone-like devices attached to the regulated telephone network,
rather than regulating the network itself. Under current policies, the
only way to fit network neutrality within the Communications Act,
therefore, is to impose obligations on information services.
C. The Internet Policy Statement and Beyond
The open-access movement eventually succeeded in convincing
regulators of its concerns. Without taking a hard look at the jurisdic-
tional questions, the FCC agreed to enforce network neutrality on a
case-by-case basis. The Commission rejected calls to adopt prospective
rules requiring broadband-network operators to offer nondiscrimina-
tory transport to application and content providers. 93 The FCC sided
with cable and telephone companies who argued that network-neu-
trality rules were unnecessary and could dampen broadband invest-
ment.9 4 Nevertheless, the FCC expressed a willingness to police
abuses when it saw them.
As part of its Wireline Broadband Order classifying DSL as an inte-
grated information service, the FCC also issued a nonbinding policy
statement. 95 Although this document explicitly disclaimed having any
legal force, it represented a strong public statement by the Commis-
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 76-77 (2005) (rejecting network neutrality in favor of network diver-
sity); Christopher S. Yoo, Network Neutrality and the Economics of Congestion, 94 GEo. LJ. 1847,
1874-1900, 1896-97, 1907-08 (2006). My purpose here is not to engage the well-devel-
oped debate over the desirability of network neutrality but to consider how any such rules
could be implemented if the FCC chose to.
92 See Comcast Order, supra note 2, at 13,049.
93 See Werbach, supra note 54, at 1268-69. Then-Chairman Michael Powell initially
addressed the issue in a speech rather than a formal proceeding. See Michael K_ Powell,
Chairman, Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, Preserving Internet Freedom: Guiding Principles for
the Industry 4 (Feb. 8, 2004), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/attach
match/DOC-243556A1.pdf.
94 See Powell, supra note 93.
95 See In re Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wire-
line Facilities, 20 F.C.C.R. 14,986, 14,987-88 (2005) [hereinafter Internet Policy
Statement].
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sion. At its core, the Policy Statement describes three user 96
entitlements:
[1) C] onsumers are entitled to access the lawful Internet content of
their choice .... [2) C]onsumers are entitled to run applications
and use services of their choice, subject to the needs of law enforce-
ment.... [3) C]onsumers are entitled to connect their choice of
legal devices that do not harm the network.97
These three policies are subject to a blanket caveat, included in a foot-
note, that "[the principles we adopt are subject to reasonable net-
work management."98  This footnote becomes the critical test.
Because all broadband-access providers impose a number of limita-
tions on applications and devices, the question is whether these limita-
tions are consistent with "reasonable network management."
The Commission asserted, without substantial analysis, that it had
the authority to take action to support the goals articulated in the
Policy Statement.99 Such initiatives would be part of the FCC's "ongo-
ing policymaking activities," whatever that meant.100 Because the Pol-
icy Statement was not an order, the FCC could not enforce it
directly. 10' Instead, the FCC described it as a list of principles that the
Commission believed were consistent with its statutory mission, and
the Commission suggested that it would take further action when
needed. 102
The first "ongoing policymaking activity" under the Policy State-
ment involved Madison River, a rural telephone company that
blocked a competing VoIP service from its broadband network. 10 3
96 I prefer the term "user" to consumer. See Benkler, Consumers to Users, supra note 61,
at 562.
97 Internet Policy Statement, supra note 95, at 14,988.
98 Id. at 14,988 n.15. There is a fourth statement, "consumers are entitled to competi-
tion among network providers, application and service providers, and content providers,"
which is entirely hortatory. Id. at 14,988. Promoting competition is part of the FCC's mis-
sion, as understood today, but there is no conceivable recourse for "violation" of this state-
ment, as it refers to the general state of certain markets. If a company eliminated or
precluded competition through anticompetitive practices, it could be subject to recourse
under either FCC rules or antitrust law. Such a case would never be brought under the
aspirational declaration of the Policy Statement.
99 In re Broadband Indus. Practices, 22 F.C.C.R. 7894, 7896 (2007) (notice of inquiry)
("The Commission, under Title I of the Communications Act, has the ability to adopt and
enforce the net neutrality principles it announced in the Internet Policy Statement.").
100 Internet Policy Statement, supra note 95, at 14,988.
101 See Press Release, Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, Chairman Kevin J. Martin Comments
on Commission Policy Statement (Aug. 5, 2005), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/
edocs-public/attachmatch/DOC-260435A2.pdf ("While policy statements do not establish
rules nor are they enforceable documents, today's statement does reflect core beliefs that
each member of this Commission holds regarding how broadband internet access should
function.").
102 See id.
103 See Press Release, Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, FCC Chairman Michael K. Powell Com-
mends Swift Action to Protect Internet Voice Services (Mar. 3, 2005), available at http://
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Madison River agreed to a consent decree after the FCC launched an
investigation of its practice. Although the case showed that the FCC
was willing to act in situations of discrimination, it had a limited im-
pact. Madison River is a traditional, regulated telephone company
that was completely blocking a service for no apparent reason other
than anticompetitive motives. It was relatively easy for the FCC to jus-
tify its intervention. The first real test of the FCC's will to promote
Internet openness came later and involved Comcast's network-man-
agement techniques.
D. The Comcast P2P Order
Comcast's network-management techniques for its cable-modem,
broadband-access service singled out peer-to-peer (P2P) applications
and surreptitiously degraded their performance.10 4 Confronted with
a concrete example of what looked like broadband discrimination,
the FCC had two choices: The Commission could fit new converged
Internet services into the existing statutory boxes of the Communica-
tions Act. Or the agency could create a new box, if it found that doing
so was necessary to carry out its explicit mandates. It did neither. The
agency tried to find the Internet within the emanations of its existing
statutory authority.
In the fall of 2007, testing revealed that Comcast, the nation's
second largest broadband-access provider, had implemented network-
management technology that deliberately slowed peer-to-peer file-
transfer traffic. 105 Here, it seemed, was a paradigmatic case of a net-
work operator foreclosing innovation and competition by discriminat-
ing against certain users of its infrastructure. P2P services could
deliver video programming, which competed with Comcast's cable-tel-
evision programming. In the post-Brand Xworld, it seemed, Comcast
had the incentive and the opportunity to violate network neutrality, as
scholars had previously warned. 10 6
hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocspublic/attachmatch/DOC-257175AI.pdf. The Madison River ac-
tion predated the Policy Statement but followed Chairman Powell's announcement of simi-
lar principles in his 2004 speech. See Powell, supra note 93, at 5-6.
104 See Comcast Order, supra note 2, at 13,031-32.
105 F.C.C. to Look at Complaints Comcast Interferes with Net, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2008, at C4;
Peter Svensson, Comcast Blocks Some Internet Traffic: Tests Confirm Data Discrimination by Num-
ber 2 U.S. Service Provider, MSNBC.COM, Oct. 19, 2007, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/
21376597/; Posting of Seth Schoen to Deeplinks Blog, http://www.eff.org/deeplinks/
2007/10/eff-tests-agree-ap-comcast-forging-packets-to-interfere (Oct. 19, 2007). Comcast
denied that its practices were significantly restricting P2P traffic. See Comcast Order, supra
note 2, at 13,050-51; Letter from Kathryn A. Zachem, Vice President, Regulatory Affairs,
Comcast Corp., to Marlene H. Dortch, Sec'y, Fed. Comm'cns Comm'n (uly 10, 2008),
available at http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native-or-pdf=pdf&id-
document=6520033822.
106 See generally Wu, Network Neutrality, supra note 84 (describing the potential for net-
work-neutrality violations).
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Several public-interest groups filed complaints against Comcast
with the FCC. 10 7 After initially denying that it was throttling P2P traf-
fic, Comcast eventually acknowledged that its network-management
approach was arbitrary and overinclusive. 10 8 It promised to imple-
ment a new, nondiscriminatory system. It also reached an agreement
with BitTorrent, the company that started to commercialize the pri-
mary video-P2P technology, on standards to address bandwidth
concerns.
1 0 9
By the time the FCC took up the complaint and the parallel peti-
tion for declaratory ruling, therefore, the question was not what would
happen, but what role the government would play. In August 2008,
the FCC rendered its decision. 110 It found that Comcast had violated
the principles embodied in the Policy Statement. The FCC ordered
Comcast to make a detailed declaration of the network-management
practices in which it had engaged and to cease and desist from throt-
tling P2P services specifically. Comcast had thirty days to stop its prac-
tices and disclose a plan for implementing new, non-application-
aware, network-management technology."' In light of Comcast's not
having notice that the FCC might enforce the Policy Statement in this
way, the FCC declined to impose any fees on the company.
The matter did not end there. Comcast complied with the FCC's
mandates' 12 but also sued to have the Order invalidated on jurisdic-
tional and procedural grounds. 113 The United States Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia Circuit heard oral arguments on the
case in January 2010.114
107 See Formal Complaint of Free Press & Public Knowledge Against Comcast Corp. for
Secretly Degrading Peer-to-Peer Applications, File No. EB-08-IH-1518 (Nov. 1, 2007).
108 See Comcast Order, supra note 2, at 13,051;Jim Puzzanghera, Comcast Relents on Web
Tech: It Allegedly Blocked BitTorrent Software for Watching Video Online, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 28,
2008, at Cl.
109 See Vishesh Kumar, Comcast, BitTorrent to Work Together on Network Traffic, WALL ST.
J., Mar. 27, 2008, at B7. BitTorrent itself (the company) was not a party to the FCC pro-
ceeding, perhaps because of its agreement with Comcast. Comcast was therefore not for-
mally prohibited from continuing its controversial broadband network management
practices prior to the FCC action. However, Comcast's public commitment to change its
practices, coupled with an agreement with the most visible provider of the BitTorrent tech-
nology, made it clear that Comcast did not intend to do so.
110 See Comcast Order, supra note 2, at 13,059-61.
III See id. Effectively, therefore, the FCC required Comcast to meet the deadline that
the company had already set for itself.
112 See Letter from Kathryn A. Zachem, Vice President, Regulatory Affairs, Comcast
Corp., to Marlene H. Dortch, Sec'y, Fed. Comm'cns Comm'n (Sept. 19, 2008), available at
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/document/view?id=6520169715.
113 Steven Musil, Comcast Appeals FCC Traffic-Blocking Ruling, CNET NEWS, Sept. 4, 2008,
http://news.cnet.com/8301-13578_3-10 0 33376-38.html.
114 See Fawn Johnson, Court Skeptical of FCC's Net-Neutrality Push, WALL ST. J., Jan. 9,
2010, at B5; Marguerite Reardon, Judges Question FCC Authority in Comcast Case, CNET NEWS,
Jan. 8, 2010, http://news.cnet.com/8301-30686_3-10430647-266.html.
552 [Vol. 95:535
OFF THE HOOK
Unfortunately, the FCC's reach exceeded its grasp. To sanction
Comcast for unreasonable and discriminatory network-management
techniques, the FCC engaged in an ad-hoc process and built an unsus-
tainable legal foundation. The Comcast order was just the tip of the
iceberg.
Section 230(b) of the Communications Act, as amended, begins:
It is the policy of the United States-
(1) to promote the continued development of the Internet and
other interactive computer services and other interactive media;
(2) to preserve the vibrant and competitive free market that
presently exists for the Internet and other interactive computer ser-
vices, unfettered by Federal or State regulation;
(3) to encourage the development of technologies which maxi-
mize user control over what information is received by individuals,
families, and schools who use the Internet and other interactive
computer services.' 1 5
In the Comcast P2P Order, the FCC based its actions on the statutory
language of section 230.116 Although the decision cited six other pro-
visions of the Communications Act in support of ancillary authority
over broadband-network management, 117 all of these provisions were
subsidiary to section 230.118 The Commission obviously understood
that its jurisdictional claim was suspect, so it took the "kitchen sink"
approach of listing every possible statutory hook. These other provi-
sions reinforce the view that an active FCC Internet policy is consistent
with established themes in the Communications Act. None of the pro-
115 47 U.S.C. § 230(b) (2006). There are two other subprovisions of section 230(b),
which are specifically related to blocking and filtering children's access to "inappropriate"
material online and to online stalking and other criminal acts. 47 U.S.C. § 230(b) (4)-(5).
116 See Comcast Order, supra note 2, at 13,035, para. 15.
117 The other provisions were section 151 (directing the Commission "to make availa-
ble, so far as possible, to all the people of the United States ... a rapid, efficient, Nation-
wide, and world-wide wire and radio communication service with adequate facilities at rea-
sonable charges"), 47 U.S.C. § 151; section 201 of the Act (requiring that "[a]ll charges,
practices, classifications, and regulations for and in connection with [common-carrier] ser-
vice, shall be just and reasonable"), id. § 201(b); section 706 of the Telecommunications
Act of 1996 (ordering the FCC to "encourage the provision of new technologies and ser-
vices to the public"), id. § 157(a); section 256 (directing the FCC "to promote nondiscrimi-
natory accessibility by the broadest number of users and vendors of communications
products and services to public telecommunications networks used to provide telecommu-
nications service"), id. § 256(a) (1); section 257 (directing the FCC to eliminate "market
entry barriers for entrepreneurs and other small businesses in the provision and ownership
of telecommunications services and information services"), id. § 257(a); and section
521(4) (directing the FCC to "assure that cable communications provide and are en-
couraged to provide the widest possible diversity of information sources and services to the
public"), id. § 521(4).
118 The section 230 discussion came first and was the longest section of the FCC's
jurisdictional analysis. The Commission stated that "Congress inscribed these policies [ad-
dressing the Internet in the 1996 Act] into section 230." Comcast Order, supra note 2, at
13,035, para. 15.
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visions, however, provide the unifying directive of congressional intent
without section 230.
The Commission noted that, in the Policy Statement, it had justi-
fied its actions on the basis of its "responsibility for overseeing and
enforcing the 'national Internet policy' Congress had established in
section 230(b)."1 19 The Policy Statement, according to the Commis-
sion, "clarified the contours" of the statutory federal policy. 120 In re-
sponse to Comcast's claim that ancillary authority must be ancillary to
something, the FCC stated directly that section 230 (b) was the founda-
tion for its jurisdictional authority in the proceeding:
[T] he "something" Comcast is looking for is right in the Act itself-
it is the national Internet policy enshrined in section 230(b) of the
Act. When Congress drafted a national Internet policy in 1996, it
did not do so on an empty tablet. Instead, Congress inscribed these
policies into section 230 of the Communications Act-the very same
Act that established this Commission as the federal agency en-
trusted with "regulating interstate and foreign commerce in com-
munication by wire." 12'
According to the Commission, therefore, the "national Internet pol-
icy" of section 230(b) gave the agency a policy directive and the au-
thority to adopt such rules necessary to effectuate it.
The FCC's analysis rests on the contention that section 230(b)
authorizes FCC oversight of the broadband-access marketplace. In
the Comcast P2P Order, the Commission made this claim by referencing
its earlier decision that Vonage, as a VoIP provider, should not be
classified as a regulated telecommunications carrier.122 There, the
Commission stated: "Through codifying its Internet policy in the
Commission's organic statute, Congress charged the Commission with
the ongoing responsibility to advance that policy consistent with our
other statutory obligations."'123 The FCC viewed the nondiscrimina-
tion decision it issued against Comcast as an exercise of this "ongoing
responsibility."124
Comcast argued that, instead, Congress intended section 230(b)
to limit regulation. 125 It pointed to the language of section 230(b) (2)
119 Id. at 13,034, para. 13.
120 Id.
121 Id. at 13,035, para. 15 (footnotes omitted).
122 See In re Vonage Holdings Corp. Petition for Declaratory Ruling Concerning an
Order of the Minn. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 19 F.C.C.R. 22,404, 22,426, para. 35 (2004) (mem.
opinion & order) [hereinafter Vonage Order] ("While we acknowledge that the title of
section 230 refers to 'offensive material,' the general policy statements regarding the In-
ternet and interactive computer services contained in the section are not similarly con-
fined to offensive material.").
123 Comcast Order, supra note 2, at 13,036 n.69.
124 Id.
125 Id. at 13,042.
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that the Internet should remain "unfettered by Federal or State regu-
lation."1 26 The FCC responded that section 230(b) (2) could not rea-
sonably be read as a prohibition on any FCC regulation of broadband-
access providers and noted that it had previously rejected such an in-
terpretation. 127 To the FCC, the "last few words" Comcast cited were a
distinct policy goal, which should not trump the main directive to pro-
mote Internet development.128
In short, the FCC painted a picture of a well-defined congres-
sional policy mandate, which the agency was faithfully effectuating.
The argument would be convincing based on the evidence cited in
the Comcast P2P Order. Unfortunately for the FCC, this position is in-
consistent with both prior FCC practice and the legislative history of
the statutory provision. Based on the oral argument, the Court of Ap-
peals appears likely to overturn the Order, upsetting the FCC's entire
framework of Internet regulation. 129
II
FAILINGS OF THE FCC's CURRENT APPROACH
The FCC's current approach to Internet regulation, however well-
intentioned, is fatally flawed. The Commission's jurisdictional theory
in the Comcast Order is simply untenable. Its substantive vision is in-
consistent with precedent. And the Comcast proceeding itself was pro-
cedurally suspect.
A. The Real Section 230
The central problem with the FCC's argument in the Comcast Or-
der is that it involves an inaccurate reading of section 230 (b). Though
on their face the statutory provisions are consistent with the FCC's
narrative, the legislative history tells a very different story. Section 230
actually limits FCC authority over the Internet, although not as com-
pletely as deregulation proponents would have it.
Section 230 was adopted as part of the Telecommunications Act
of 1996.130 It is the only provision in that massive overhaul of the
Communications Act that directly references the Internet, 13 1 a fact
126 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(2) (2006).
127 See Comcast Order, supra note 2, at 13,042-43, paras. 25-26. The Commission also
claimed that Comcast had waived its right to contest FCCjurisdiction in the case based on
an earlier proceeding involving Comcast's acquisition of certain cable systems from Adel-
phia Communications. See id. at 13,043-44, para. 27.
128 Id. at 13,042, para. 24.
129 SeeJohnson, supra note 114; Reardon, supra note 114.
130 See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
131 Other legislation added provisions to the Communications Act dealing with topics
such as restrictions on children's access to material on the Web, 47 U.S.C. § 231, and a
moratorium on Internet taxes, Internet Tax Freedom Act, id. § 151.
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that supports the FCC's claim that it represents a "national Internet
policy."1 32 However, the vague and inconsistent language of section
230(b) belies the FCC's claim that the provision was intended to carry
such weight. Congress expressed its desire for affirmative steps to
"promote," "preserve," and "encourage" Internet development and, at
the same time, an Internet "unfettered" by regulation. 133 The first
three subsections, which are the ones the FCC cites in the Comcast
Order, offer no specific directives, in contrast to the detailed provisions
in the rest of the Telecommunications Act.
The legislative history of section 230 clears up the confusion.
Section 230 began as a freestanding bill, the Internet Freedom and
Family Empowerment Act (IFFEA), introduced in 1995 by Representa-
tives Christopher Cox and Ron Wyden. 134 The IFFEA was subse-
quently accepted as an amendment to the House version of the 1996
Telecommunications Act.135 The House-Senate conference commit-
tee adopted the House language virtually intact in the final version of
the legislation. 13 6
At the time, the congressional debate about Internet regulation
and its relationship to the FCC involved government limitation of on-
line content. 137 Senator James Exon of Nebraska had introduced the
controversial Communications Decency Act (CDA), which would have
barred indecent speech on the Internet.138 Under the CDA, online
indecency would have been restricted in much the same manner as
indecency on broadcast television and radio are today.1 39 The legisla-
tion was extremely controversial. 140 Experts warned that it would
quash free expression in the new medium of the Internet; 141 however,
the CDA tapped into politically powerful fears about the Internet be-
coming a haven for pornography and illicit materials. 142 The CDA
was incorporated into both the Senate and House versions of the Tele-
communications Act. 1 43
132 See Wireline Broadband Order, supra note 32, at 14,987.
1'3 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(1)-(3).
134 Internet Freedom and Family Empowerment Act, H.R. 1978, 104th Cong. (1995).
135 See 141 CONG. REC. H8478-79 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995).
136 See H.R. REP. No. 104-458, at 81-84, 86-88 (1996) (Conf. Rep.).
137 See generally Robert Cannon, The Legislative History of Senator Exon's Communications
Decency Act: Regulating Barbarians on the Information Superhighway, 49 FED. COMM. L.J. 51,
65-67 (1996) (discussing congressional debates over regulating online content).
138 See Communications Decency Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 502, 110 Stat. 133,
134-35 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 223(d) (1) (B), (h)(2)).
139 See Cannon, supra note 137, at 57.
140 See id. at 65-67.
141 See id. at 70.
142 See id. at 64.
143 See id. at 68-69.
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Civil libertarians were not the only ones concerned about the
CDA. Many Internet businesses saw it as a major economic threat.1 44
An early court decision, Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services Co.,
found online-service providers such as Prodigy responsible for libelous
postings by their subscribers.1 45 With the boundaries of intermediary
liability online unclear-and such liability potentially quite exten-
sive-Internet access and service providers worried they would be
forced into the role of private online censors or held responsible for
content beyond their control. 146 Even worse, the language of Stratton
suggested that online-service providers who took steps to exclude any
inappropriate or illegal content would be more likely to face liability
for questionable material they did not block. 147
The IFFEA was introduced in response to these fears about the
CDA. 148 It represented an alternative approach to dealing with the
widespread concern about pornography and other online material
that was inappropriate for children. Where the CDA proposed gov-
ernment regulation of Internet speech, the IFFEA endorsed nongov-
ernmental mechanisms and prohibited government regulation. 149
The IFFEA offered a specific alternative to the CDA's private censor-
ship: a safe harbor for online-service providers for content over which
they had no control and limited liability for ISPs, even when they take
affirmative steps to remove unauthorized or illegal material. 150 That
safe harbor now appears in later provisions of section 230 of the Com-
munications Act.151
In other words, the "national Internet policy" of section 230(b)
was essentially a lead-in to the substantive provisions of section 230(c)
and (d). Comcast made this argument before the FCC in its recent
adjudication, but the Commission rejected the interpretation. 52 The
144 See id. at 90.
145 Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., 1995 WL 323710, at *5 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
May 4, 1995).
146 See Cannon, supra note 137, at 59, 62-63.
147 See id. at 61-62.
148 See id. at 67-69.
149 See Internet Freedom and Family Empowerment Act, H.R. 1978, 104th Cong.
(1995); Steven Levy, No Place for Kids? A Parents' Guide to Sex on the Net, NEWSWEEK, July 3,
1995 ("Conservative Republican Chris Cox of California has teamed with liberal Democrat
Ron Wyden of Oregon to develop the grandiosely entitled Internet Freedom and Family
Empowerment Act. Basically, the bill would forbid the federal government from creating
any regulatory agency to govern the Internet, relying instead on a variety of means (not yet
determined) to protect children.").
150 See Cannon, supra note 137, at 68.
151 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (2006).
152 See Comcast Order, supra note 2, at 13,036 n.69. Comcast argued that Congress
had chosen a specific remedy, a safe harbor for good actors in sections 230(c)-(d), as a
means of implementing the goals in section 230(b). This argument, implying that the safe
harbor was the sole means of implementing the aspirational portions of section 230, goes
further than necessary. There is a significant difference between claiming that Congress
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Commission asserted that the framing of section 230(b) as the "'pol-
icy of the United States"' implies that it has broader application than
the specific provisions Congress adopted, to be filled in by the Com-
mission under its general grant of authority.153 This reading conflicts
with the legislative history.
Congress added the Cox-Wyden amendment to the Telecommu-
nications Act to address inappropriate online content and to prevent
ISP liability. The amendment was titled "Online Family Empower-
ment.'1 54 As codified, section 230 is titled "Protection for private
blocking and screening of offensive material."' 55 These titles belie the
FCC's claim that section 230 was intended as a broader "national In-
ternet policy."
The House-Senate conference committee report similarly de-
scribes the purpose of the provision: "Section 104 of the House
amendment protects from civil liability those providers and users of
interactive computer services for actions to restrict or to enable re-
striction of access to objectionable online material. ' 156 Representative
Cox, one of the provision's authors, has emphasized this aspect when
describing the purpose of the bill.157 The purpose of the Cox-Wyden
legislation was to protect the Internet by protecting service providers
potentially subject to liability, not by advancing the broader vision of
the open-access advocates.
If section 230 were intended as a broad invitation to create a na-
tional Internet policy, there would be at least some contemporaneous
evidence consistent with this interpretation. In fact, a more likely
reading is that, to the extent Congress intended to send a broad mes-
sage to the FCC in section 230, it was to limit the Commission's au-
thority. Specifically, section 230 sought to preclude retail-price and
content regulation of the Internet. As originally introduced, the
decided only to adopt a safe harbor and claiming that Congress directed the FCC to create
a "national Internet policy" in any way it saw fit under the policy goals of section 230(b).
153 Id.
154 141 CONG. REc. H8468 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995).
155 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2006).
156 S. REP. No. 104-230, at 194 (1996) (Conf. Rep.).
157 See 146 CONG. REc. H6067 (daily ed. July 17, 2000) (statement of Rep. Cox)
("Third, the [Internet Gambling Prohibition Act of 2000] would unfairly make ... interac-
tive service providers. . . responsible for policing the behavior of their subscribers. This is
the principle that we rejected when then Representative Wyden and I brought the Internet
Freedom and Family Empowerment Act to the floor so that we could stop the approach
that the Senate had adopted with the Communications Decency Act, later rejected by the
Supreme Court."); see also Christopher Cox, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Elec-
tronic Shareholder Forum Rules; Codification of Interpretation of Rule 14(a) (8) (i) (8)
(Nov. 28, 2007), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2007/spch112807cc.htm
(explaining that the bill "enhanced free speech on the Internet by making it unnecessary
for internet service providers to unduly restrict customers' actions for fear of being found
legally liable for their conduct").
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Cox-Wyden amendment included the following provision: "FCC REG-
ULATION OF THE INTERNET AND OTHER INTERACTIVE COMPUTER SER-
VICES PROHIBITED-Nothing in this Act shall be construed to grant any
jurisdiction or authority to the Commission with respect to economic
or content regulation of the Internet or other interactive computer
services." 158 This was not an insignificant element of the bill. Repre-
sentative Cox later described the goal of the legislation that became
section 230 as keeping the FCC from "regulating prices of computer
services offered over the Internet."'1 59 Representatives Cox and
Wyden later teamed up to introduce the Internet Tax Freedom Act,
which established a moratorium on new Internet-specific taxes. 160
Representative Cox, who subsequently became Chairman of the Se-
curities and Exchange Commission, has elsewhere expressed fears
about the FCC turning into a "Federal Computer Commission" by en-
gaging in direct regulation of Internet-based services. 161
The Senate passed a telecommunications bill including the CDA,
and the House passed a bill including the Cox-Wyden language,
meaning that it fell to a House-Senate conference committee to rec-
oncile the conflict.1 62 Although the two amendments represented op-
posing policy positions, they were not facially inconsistent with one
another. 163 The conference committee compromised and left both in
the final bill.
The most significant change to the Cox-Wyden language was the
removal of the provision expressly precluding economic and content
regulation of the Internet by the FCC. The conference committee
report is silent on the rationale for this deletion, stating only that
158 See Internet Freedom and Family Empowerment Act, H.R. 1978, 104th Cong.
§ 230(d) (1995).
159 Press Release, Rep. Cox, Sen. Wyden to Unveil Highly-Touted Bill to Keep the In-
ternet Free from Taxes (Mar. 12, 1997) (on file with author) ("Rep. Cox has been a long
time supporter of the Internet. His Internet Freedom and Family Empowerment Act ap-
proved by the U.S. House of Representatives in the summer of 1995, called on the Federal
Communications Commission to stay [away] from regulating prices of computer services
offered over the Internet." (emphasis omitted)).
160 See Internet Tax Freedom Act, Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681-719 (1998).
161 Congressmen Decry the "Federal Computer Commission", TECH L.J., Mar. 31, 1998,
http://www.techlawjournal.com/telecom/80331fcc.htm; see Werbach, supra note 17, at
8-9.
162 See Ken S. Myers, Wikimmunity: Fitting the Communications Decency Act to Wikipedia, 20
HARv. J.L. & TECH 163, 174 (2006).
163 See Barbara Esbin & Adam Marcus, "The Law Is Whatever the Nobles Do": Undue Process
at the FCC, 17 CoMMLAw CONSPECTUS 535, 592 (2009). In fact, some commentators con-
cluded that the Cox-Wyden bill was a mere symbolic challenge to the CDA, allowing
House members to claim opposition without actually sinking the indecency restrictions.
See Cannon, supra note 137, at 67-69. This interpretation is even further from the FCC's
view in the Comcast Order that section 230 was designed as an affirmative national Internet
policy with substantive teeth. See supra text accompanying note 119.
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"[t]he conference agreement adopts the House provision with minor
modifications." 16 4
The removal of the provision suggests that Congress did not in-
tend to exclude the FCC from Internet regulation. However, that
does not imply that Congress had the opposite intention. Classifying
the deletion as a "minor modification[ ]" implies that the limited, der-
egulatory focus of the provision remained intact. The rest of the con-
ference committee report on the new section 230 reiterates the focus
on precluding liability for users and providers who restrict access to
objectionable online material. 165
There appear to be no contemporaneous statements suggesting
that section 230(b), when introduced and adopted by Congress, was
intended to "charge[ ] the Commission with.., ongoing responsibil-
ity" to ensure Internet openness.1 66 To the contrary, the legislative
history and text of the 1996 Act strongly suggest that Congress was
seeking to moderate the restrictive consequences of existing court de-
cisions and its own actions. 16 7
Viewed in context, the section 230 "fix" was a way to avoid imposi-
tion of common-carrier rules on Internet-based service providers. 168
The reason online-service providers faced the risk of liability for con-
tent they transmitted was that they were not common carriers. A com-
mon carrier such as a telephone company is immune from liability for
the content it transmits because it is precluded from exerting any con-
trol over that content. 169 Common carriers, however, are subject to
many other intrusive regulations.1 70 Internet-based service providers
did not wish to avail themselves of the common-carrier safe harbor
because of the burden that came with it. Congress adopted section
230 to ensure that the reverse was not true: the benefit of unregulated
status as an information-service provider did not imply greater liability
for content on their networks. That is different from saying that on-
line-service providers were exempt from all potential FCC regulation.
164 H.R. REP. No. 104-458, at 194 (1996) (Conf. Rep.); see id. at 81-84, 86-88.
165 See id. at 81-84, 86-88.
166 See Comcast Order, supra note 2, at 13,036 n.69 (quoting Vonage Order, supra note
122, at 22,426).
167 See, e.g., Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 601, 110 Stat. 56,
143 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 203 (2006)) (regarding the applicability of consent decrees).
168 Congress also may have intended to stop the FCC from imposing broadcast-like
content controls on the Internet, other than the ones mandated under the CDA.
169 See HUBER ET AL., supra note 18, at 13-14.
170 Indeed, common carriers are the most extensively regulated class under the Com-
munications Act. There are several other categories subject to less onerous restrictions.
See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 153(26) (2006) ("Local exchange carrier"); id. § 153(44) ("Telecom-
munications carrier"); id. § 153(46) ("Telecommunications service"); id. § 153(47) ("Tele-
phone exchange service").
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The CDA provisions of the 1996 Act were challenged on First
Amendment grounds immediately upon adoption. The Supreme
Court found the legislation facially unconstitutional. 71 Accordingly,
the Court struck from the statute the CDA language (section 223).
The Cox-Wyden language of section 230, however, remained in ef-
fect. A naive reader of the Communications Act today would there-
fore see, as the FCC described, language supporting Internet
promotion with no counter balancing restrictions. The legislative his-
tory, however, shows the true picture. Section 230 tells the FCC not to
put the new wine of the Internet into the old bottles of common-car-
rier or broadcast regulation.
B. Delegation Issues
Removing the section 230 foundation from the FCC's Internet
jurisdictional theory creates more serious problems. An administra-
tive agency such as the FCC cannot act without a legislative delegation
from Congress. 172 In two 1935 cases, the Supreme Court invalidated
federal statutes for not providing intelligible principles to agencies,
thus violating the constitutional mandate that all legislative power re-
main vested in Congress. 173 This nondelegation doctrine was not in-
voked to overturn a statute for more than sixty years and was
considered a relic; 174 however, the Supreme Court has recently exer-
cised greater scrutiny over agency delegations. A prime example,
AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utilities Board,175 involved the FCC. There, as
here, the Commission claimed that Congress had invited it to regulate
in a broad, new area with little discretion over its policy choices.
In Iowa Utilities Board, the Court invalidated portions of the Tele-
communications Act of 1996 for not providing any "limiting standard,
rationally related to the goals" of the Act. 176 The Act required incum-
bent local-exchange carriers to unbundle network elements that were
"necessary" for competitors but left it to the Commission to interpret
171 See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 861-63, 882-83 (1997) (severing the unconstitu-
tional CDA language from 47 U.S.C. § 223(a) (1), (d)).
172 See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Schechter Poultry at the Millennium: A Delegation Doctrine
for the Administrative State, 109 YALE L.J. 1399, 1403-06 (2000); Cynthia R. Farina, Statutoiy
Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 452,
478-88 (1989) (tracing the evolution of the nondelegation doctrine).
173 See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 541-42 (1935);
Pan. Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 421-30 (1935).
174 See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Disciplining Delegation After Whitman v. American Truck-
ing Ass'ns, 87 CORNELL L. REv. 452, 455 (2002) ("Since then, courts and commentators
have viewed the doctrine as dead or at least dormant."); see also Indus. Union Dep't v. Am.
Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 607-08 (1980) (plurality opinion) (invalidating a standard
set by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration).
175 525 U.S. 366 (1999).
176 Id. at 388.
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that term. 77 The Commission simply defined as "necessary" all those
elements that new entrants had sought in its rulemaking process. 178
The Supreme Court held that Congress had failed to make the hard
policy choices involved in choosing the appropriate network elements
to unbundle. 179 Congress could not simply pass that decision on to
the Commission, nor could the Commission then effectively pass it on
to a set of private actors with a strong self-interest in the result.'80
Two years later, in Whitman v. American Trucking Ass'ns, Inc., the
Supreme Court limited the scope of the doctrine. 81 It reversed the
District of Columbia Circuit for concluding that the Clean Air Act in-
volved an impermissible delegation to the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA).182 The Court found that statutory language directing
the EPA to set certain standards at a level of safety that was "requisite
to protect the public health" 18 3 offered "substantial guidance" to the
administrative agency.' 8 4 The Court concluded that even such a
broad command represented sufficient exercise by Congress of its leg-
islative responsibilities.' 85
The FCC's approach in the Comcast Order fails the Iowa Utilities
Board test, even under the more expansive standard of American Truck-
ing. The 1996 Act defines "information services," but it does not pro-
vide any guidance at all for regulating them. Until now, this has not
been a problem. The Title I information-services classification was im-
portant solely because it meant that certain rules did not apply.'8 6
There was no need to consider what rules for information services
were important because there were no rules. All that changed when
the FCC decided to require that information-service providers such as
Comcast's broadband-access operation adhere to the mandates of the
Policy Statement.
177 Id. at 388-89; see 47 U.S.C. § 251 (d) (2) (2006) ("[T]he Commission shall consider,
at a minimum, whether... access to such network elements as are proprietary in nature is
necessary . . ").
178 Bressman, supra note 172, at 1432-33.
179 See Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. at 397.
180 See id. at 388-89; Bressman, supra note 172, at 1436-37.
181 See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 486 (2001).
182 Id.
183 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b) (1) (2006).
184 Am. Trucking, 531 U.S. at 475.
185 See id. at 472-76. The decision also rejected the notion, advanced by some scholars
and the D.C. Circuit, that an administrative agency could cure a faulty delegation through
its own development of limiting standards. See id. at 472.
186 The information-services category continued the FCC's enhanced-services classifi-
cation, which served both to establish an unregulated zone and to ensure that regulated
network operators could not interfere with it. See Steve Bickerstaff, Shackles on the Giant:
How the Federal Government Created Microsoft, Personal Computers, and the Internet, 78 TEx. L.
RIv. 1, 46-47 (1999).
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To the FCC, the "national Internet policy" of section 230 pro-
vided the limiting principle. According to the story told by the FCC in
the Comcast decision, Congress made the decision to favor an open,
unfettered Internet, properly limiting the FCC's discretion. 187 As de-
scribed above, however, this interpretation rests on a faulty reading of
the statute and its legislative history.18 Congress expressed a policy
preference for further development of the Internet and for an In-
ternet unfettered by regulation. Congress thus did not delegate gen-
eral rulemaking authority over the Internet in section 230.
The Policy Statement itself cannot serve as the limiting principle.
Under American Trucking, an agency cannot cure an improper delega-
tion by developing the necessary standards itself.'8 9 Even if the FCC
could do so, the Policy Statement would not qualify as a sufficient
limit on agency discretion. The Policy Statement is sui generis; it was
issued with no record and no detailed analysis, simply as a statement
of the Commission's views. Neither it nor the Comcast decision was
issued through a rulemaking proceeding. 190 An adjudication of an
individual case cannot itself provide the limiting standard for future
agency action.191
If section 230 is not the congressional limiting principle on FCC
regulation of information services, under the current FCC theory, that
leaves only the general public-interest standard of the Communica-
tions Act.192 That language could not be sufficient to save the Comcast
Order from a nondelegation challenge. Iowa Utilities Board involved
rules adopted under the same statute. If requiring unbundling when
"necessary" provides no "limiting standard, rationally related to the
goals" of the statute, 193 the Internet case is even more extreme, be-
cause Congress offered no constraints at all, other than the definition
of information services. A different source for FCC authority must be
identified.
187 See Comcast Order, supra note 2, at 13,042.
188 See supra Part II.A.
189 See Am. Trucking, 531 U.S. at 472-73.
190 See Comcast Order, supra note 2, at 13,045 (stating that the Commission was acting
in an adjudication, not a rulemaking); Internet Policy Statement, supra note 95, at 14,988
& n.15 (stating that the Policy Statement is not a set of enforceable rules).
191 By definition, an adjudication is binding only on the parties before the agency; it is
not a prospective rule applicable to an entire industry. See Bressman, supra note 172, at
1420 (arguing that agencies must promulgate limiting standards through notice-and-com-
ment rulemaking procedures for those standards to be "generally applicable, visible, and
binding").
192 See 47 U.S.C. § 303(r) (2006).
193 AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 388 (1999).
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C. Other Problems with the Commission's Approach
1. Whatever Happened to Unregulation?
Although the FCC claims to be consistently implementing the
statutory scheme, the Comcast Order represents a significant departure
from the agency's longstanding reticence to impose binding obliga-
tions on Internet-based providers.
Section 230 was adopted twelve years before the Comcast Order.194
During that time, the Commission repeatedly rejected calls to adopt
rules governing Internet-based services. For example, it took no ac-
tion on a 1995 petition to classify VoIP services under the rules gov-
erning telecommunications carriers. 195 It issued an extensive report
to Congress in 1998 declining to impose interstate access charges on
VoIP providers at that time-even on those providers whose services
arguably fell within the statutory standard for such charges. 196 It de-
clined to regulate the Internet-backbone market, even when the com-
petitiveness of that market was questioned. 197 It resisted calls in 1999
to impose "open access" conditions on cable-broadband providers.1 98
It allowed competitive local-exchange carriers to collect reciprocal
compensation for carrying traffic to dial-up Internet-service providers,
lest those ISPs fall within the scope of traditional FCC regulation. 199 It
even published a working paper that identified an FCC policy of "un-
regulation" of the Internet. 200
The cable open-access debate is particularly instructive, as it in-
volved the same claims about anticompetitive threats to the open In-
ternet as the Comcast P2P proceeding.20 1 The Commission considered
whether to mandate competitive access to the cable-modem platform
in several proceedings, in each case declining to adopt a classification
194 See Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 509, 110 Stat. 56, 137
(codified at 47 U.S.C. § 203); Comcast Order, supra note 2.
195 See In re The Provision of Interstate & Int'l Interexchange Telecomms. Serv. via the
"Internet" by Non-Tariffed, Uncertified Entities, Rulemaking No. 8775 (Mar. 4, 1995) (pe-
tition for declaratory ruling, special relief, & institution of rulemaking), available at http://
www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Common Carrier/Other/actapet.html; Werbach, supra note 17, at
44 n.217 ("The Commission has broad latitude in how to respond to petitions for rulemak-
ing, and in [this] case it simply did not proceed with any further action.").
196 See Stevens Report, supra note 24, at 11,503-04.
197 See Michael Kende, The Digital Handshake: Connecting Internet Backbones, 11 COMM-
LAW CONSPECtus 45, 52-70 (2003); Werbach, supra note 54, at 1255.
198 See Lemley & Lessig, supra note 9, at 946-57; Werbach, supra note 54, at 1268.
199 See In re Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the Telecomms.
Act of 1996, 14 F.C.C.R. 3689, 3689-90 (Feb. 25, 1999) (declaratory ruling & notice of
proposed rulemaking) [hereinafter Local Competition Ruling].
200 Oxman, supra note 31, passim.
201 See Franoois Bar et al., Access and Innovation Policy for the Third-Generation Internet, 24
TELECOMM. POL'Y 489, 490 (2000); Lemley & Lessig, supra note 9, at 928.
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that would impose such a mandate.202 When the FCC ultimately de-
cided that cable-broadband services were information services and not
telecommunications services, 203 the Commission stated that its goal
was to adopt a framework that "encourages the ubiquitous availability
of broadband to all Americans, '20 4 consistent with section 706(a) of
the 1996 Act, which promotes universal accessibility of advanced com-
munications services. 20 5 The Commission used section 230(f) (2) as
further support for not classifying a portion of wireline-broadband ac-
cess as a telecommunications service subject to Title II obligations. 20 6
In the order, the FCC made no reference at all to the supposedly cen-
tral policy mandate of section 230(b).
This framing of the statutory-scheme standard stands in sharp
contrast to the Commission's description of the congressional "na-
tional Internet policy" six years later. In fact, prior to the Policy State-
ment in 2005, the FCC used the phrase "national Internet policy" only
twice: to support federal preemption of state VoIP regulation 20 7 and
to describe its "unregulation" approach in connection with the court
challenge to the cable-modem classification. 20 8
These inconsistencies do not completely discredit the Comcast de-
cision, but they suggest that the Commission needs to further articu-
late its position. The FCC is entitled to revise its interpretation of the
statute to give greater emphasis to the procompetitive language in sec-
tion 230(b).209 Nothing in the Comcast Order is inconsistent with the
FCC's prior classification decisions or with a general skepticism to-
ward excessive regulation of the Internet. Furthermore, nothing in
the earlier "unregulation" decisions suggests that the FCC would
never impose regulations on broadband providers. In fact, once the
Commission classified both cable-modem and telephone-based DSL
offerings as information services, the agency and the courts repeatedly
stated that new rules under Title I might be needed to achieve policy
objectives that could no longer be realized through other Titles.210
202 See Wireline Broadband Order, supra note 32, at 14,856, para. 2; id. at 14,856-59
nn.6-10.
203 See id. at 14,857-58, para. 4.
204 Id. at 14,855, para. 1.
205 See id. at 14,856-57 n.8.
206 See id. at 14,864 n.41.
207 See Vonage Order, supra note 122, at 22,425.
208 Press Release, Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, FCC Court Brief Underscores Consumer
Benefits from National Internet Policy of Unregulation; Urges Narrow Judicial Resolution
(Aug. 16, 1999), available at http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Miscellaneous/NewsReleases/
1999/nrmc9O6O.txt.
209 See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 863-64
(1984) ("An initial agency interpretation is not instantly carved in stone.").
210 See Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S 967, 976
(2005) ("Information-service providers, by contrast, are not subject to mandatory common-
carrier regulation under Title II, though the Commission has jurisdiction to impose addi-
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The problem is that the Comcast Order rests on ambiguous statu-
tory authority. The Commission's refusal to acknowledge that ambi-
guity calls into question the validity of the underlying statutory
delegation. Section 230(b) is internally inconsistent: it sings the
praises of an open, competitive Internet-which might not emerge
through market forces alone-as well as those of minimal regulation.
The relationship of section 230(b) to section 706(a) and other provi-
sions of the statute is also unclear. Justice Antonin Scalia concluded
that the 1996 Act is "in many important respects a model of ambiguity
or indeed even self-contradiction." 211 As the Supreme Court noted,
the Act's statutory ambiguity makes it incumbent on the FCC to make
the hard choices necessary to constrain its own discretion. 212
2. The Substance of the National Internet Policy
Congress intended section 230 to limit, rather than expand, FCC
regulatory authority. The Commission was undoubtedly correct that
Congress did not intend to preclude all FCC oversight of broadband
access. 213 Nevertheless, it does not follow that Congress endorsed any
regulation the FCC saw fit to impose. Section 230 was designed to
foreclose FCC regulation of the Internet under the traditional price
regulation of telecommunications. 214 To be faithful to the statute, the
FCC would have to define the scope of regulation consistently with
those restrictions.
The Commission's definition of its statutory mandate, however,
also begs for justification. In its Policy Statement, the Commission
claimed that the "essence" of the national Internet policy is to "en-
courage broadband deployment and preserve and promote the open
and interconnected nature of the public Internet."215 This gloss in-
volves two subtle shifts from the express language of section 230(b).
First, the Commission interpreted the section 230(b) (1) mandate "'to
promote the continued development of the Internet"' 216 as one "to
encourage broadband deployment."217 The emphasis on broadband
deployment derives from section 706(a) of the Act, which charges the
FCC with "encourag[ing] the deployment on a reasonable and timely
basis of advanced telecommunications capability to all Americans."218
tional regulatory obligations under its Title I ancillary jurisdiction to regulate interstate
and foreign communications . . ").
211 AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 397 (1999).
212 See id. at 387-92, 397.
213 See Comcast Order, supra note 2, at 13,042-43, para. 25.
214 See supra text accompanying notes 158-61.
215 Internet Policy Statement, supra note 95, at 14,988 (emphasis omitted).
216 Id. at 14,987, para. 2 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(1) (2006)).
217 Id. at 14,988 (emphasis omitted).
218 47 U.S.C. § 1302(a).
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The Commission cited this provision in both the Policy Statement and
the Comcast Order.219
Although broadband deployment is certainly a means to "pro-
mote the continued development of the Internet,"220 the connection
is not so clear in the Comcast case. Comcast argued that P2P file shar-
ing was overwhelming the capacity of its broadband network.221 To
Comcast, therefore, the FCC's restrictions on its network-management
practices impeded deployment of its broadband service. Even if one
believes that Comcast degraded P2P file transfers to prevent competi-
tion with its own video offerings, the threat of revenue cannibalization
might cause the company to scale back its broadband investment.
Determining the nexus between an open or neutral Internet and
the deployment mandate of section 706(a) is one of the "hard
choices" that either Congress or the agency must make if the FCC's
actions are to represent a valid delegation. 222 The FCC could convinc-
ingly argue that measures to preserve an open and interconnected
Internet would best promote broadband deployment and the statu-
tory scheme more generally. The problem is that neither the Policy
Statement nor the Comcast Order contains such analysis. 223 Because
the FCC has not connected the dots, it has not properly limited its
own freedom of action.224
3. Process: The Problem of Ad-Hoc Decision Making
Any application of the Policy Statement to decide actual cases
raises serious administrative-law questions. The Administrative Proce-
dure Act (APA) provides for procedural protections whenever an
agency engages in either rulemaking or adjudication, but principles
are not binding unless they are embodied in legislative rules.2 25 The
Commission's assertion that it "will incorporate the above principles
into its ongoing policymaking activities," 226-qualified by a footnote
219 See Comcast Order, supra note 2, at 13,036, para. 16; Internet Policy Statement,
supra note 95, at 14,987, para. 3.
220 Comcast Order, supra note 2, at 13,082-83.
221 See id. at 13,034-38.
222 See Bressman, supra note 174, at 461.
223 The FCC stated in the Comcast Order that "prohibiting network operators from
blocking or degrading consumer access to desirable content and applications on-line will
result in increased consumer demand for high-speed Internet access and, therefore, in-
creased deployment to meet that demand." See Comcast Order, supra note 2, at 13,039,
para. 18. This claim, with no supporting analysis or data, appears in the laundry list of
statutory bases for jurisdiction other than section 230. A more searching inquiry is needed
to form a foundation for FCC jurisdiction and proper administrative delegation.
224 See AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 387-92 (1999); Bressman, supra
note 174, at 452-53.
225 See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2006).
226 Internet Policy Statement, supra note 95, at 14,988, para. 5.
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stating that it was "not adopting rules in this policy statement"227-is
confusing. If the Policy Statement's principles are not rules, how can
the FCC circulate, according to an FCC source, "'an item that finds
Comcast's broadband network management practices to be in viola-
tion of the FCC's policy principles' "?228
By sanctioning Comcast for violating the Policy Statement, the
FCC has built a castle on air. Because the Policy Statement, by its own
terms, does not adopt rules, the clear implication is that such rules
must come from "ongoing policymaking activities." 229 However, the
FCC's "ongoing policymaking activities" in the Comcast case are justi-
fied on the basis of the Policy Statement! The Commission cannot
turn nonrules into rules simply by separately issuing an order.230
Under SEC v. Chenery Corp., administrative agencies have discre-
tion to resolve disputes through either case-by-case adjudication or
comprehensive rulemaking. 231 The FCC will defend its actions by
claiming that it is merely adjudicating a complaint filed over a matter
within its jurisdiction. 232 This contention has some merit. Although
the FCC traditionally makes policy almost exclusively through
rulemaking, other agencies, such as the National Labor Relations
Board, prefer adjudication. 233
Nevertheless, an administrative adjudication must have some le-
gal basis. If an agency could unilaterally declare a policy and then
hold any company accountable to it, these actions would be tanta-
mount to exercising rulemaking authority.234 An adjudication to en-
227 Id. at 14,988 n.15.
228 Chloe Albanesius, FCC: Comcast Broke Rules, But Will Not Face Fines, PCMAG.COM, July
11, 2008, http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2325455,00.asp (quoting "an FCC
source"). FCC Chairman Kevin J. Martin made the even stronger statement that compa-
nies such as Comcast bear the burden of proof when they violate FCC policies: "'When
they show they are blocking access to some sort of content, they have the burden to show
that what they are doing is reasonable.'" Saul Hansell, F.C.C. Chief Would Bar Comcast from
Imposing Web Restrictions, N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 2008, at Cl.
229 Internet Policy Statement, supra note 95, at 14,988.
230 See Philip J. Weiser, The Future oflnternet Regulation 32 (Univ. of Colo. Law Sch.,
Working Paper No. 09-02, 2009) ("The FCC's determination that Comcast violated its In-
ternet Policy Statement is also vulnerable on the legal ground that an agency cannot en-
force a policy statement that did not emerge from notice-and-comment rulemaking or
explicitly warn parties that it would be enforced.").
231 SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 203 (1947) ("[T]he choice made between
proceeding by general rule or by individual, ad hoc litigation is one that lies primarily in the
informed discretion of the administrative agency.").
232 See Comcast Order, supra note 2, at 13,044.
233 See NLRB v. Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc., 494 U.S. 775, 819 (1990) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting). Moreover, there may be an argument that case-by-case adjudication is a better
mechanism for novel situations where an agency has no track record of understanding the
relevant issues. See M. Elizabeth Magill, Agency Choice of Policymaking Form, 71 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1383, 1406 (2004); Weiser, supra note 230, at 51.
234 See Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Fed. Power Comm'n, 506 F.2d 33, 38 (D.C. Cir. 1974)
("The agency cannot apply or rely upon [a policy statement] as law because a general
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force statutory obligations requires some indication that the statute
does, in fact, describe legal obligations. But the Policy Statement was
adopted with no prior notice or opportunity to challenge it, as a
stand-alone document that expressly disclaimed any legal force. 235
In the Comcast case, the FCC considered the complaint simultane-
ously with a petition for declaratory ruling and a notice of inquiry on
the same set of topics, only choosing to announce at the end of the
order that it was treating the matter as an adjudication. 236 That pur-
ported adjudication involved no on-the-record hearings or testi-
mony.2 37 The FCC held two public forums on broadband-network
management, one of which included a presentation by a Comcast rep-
resentative. 238 The Commission itself acknowledged that it could not
fine Comcast for its actions because the company had insufficient no-
tice that the obligations of the Policy Statement were to be en-
forced. 239 Given these procedural shortcomings, the Comcast decision
faces a stiff challenge in court.
Even if the Comcast Order survives a judicial challenge, the FCC's
approach is problematic. Case-by-case resolution requires a time-con-
suming, after-the-fact assessment of the challenged practice. The only
guidance the FCC provides in the Policy Statement is the language
that "reasonable network management" is acceptable. 240 The Com-
mission will have to develop a jurisprudence to give meaning to that
term through its resolution of complaints. 241 In the Comcast case, the
FCC stated that networking engineers did not consider the techniques
statement of policy only announces what the agency seeks to establish as policy."); Robert
A. Anthony, Interpretive Rules, Policy Statements, Guidances, Manuals, and the Like-Should Fed-
eral Agencies Use Them to Bind the Public?, 41 DuKE L.J. 1311, 1317 (1992).
235 See Internet Policy Statement, supra note 95, at 14,988 n.15; Weiser, supra note 230,
at 32-33 & n.ll0.
236 The caption of the Free Press petition, which references seven separate rulemaking
dockets, belies the claim that the Comcast proceeding was best seen as an adjudication of a
private dispute between two parties. See Wireline Broadband Order, supra note 32.
237 See Weiser, supra note 230, at 32 (explaining that the "proceeding lacked most-if
not all-of the characteristics associated with traditional fact-finding" and that the agency
"did not receive any evidence under oath, held no cross-examination, and merely evalu-
ated filings where parties advanced self-serving claims").
238 See Press Release, Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, FCC Announces Second Public En
Banc Hearing on Broadband Network Management Practices at Stanford University, Palo
Alto, California (Mar. 19, 2008), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/attach
match/DOC-280895Al.pdf; Press Release, Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, FCC Announces Pub-
lic En Banc Hearing in Cambridge, Massachusetts on Broadband Network Management
Practices (Feb. 12, 2008), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocspublic/attach
match/DOC-280194Al.pdf.
239 See Comcast Order, supra note 2, at 13,047.
240 Internet Policy Statement, supra note 95, at 14,988 n.15.
241 See Weiser, supra note 230, at 31 ("The FCC's decision in the Comcast matter repre-
sents the beginning of what is likely to be a challenging effort to define 'reasonable net-
work management.'").
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Comcast employed reasonable. 242 The primary basis for the Commis-
sion's conclusion was the testimony of a few experts. 243 Contrary to
the FCC's assertion, the challenged practices do not violate the stan-
dards of the Internet Engineering Task Force, although engineers
generally disfavor such practices. 244 A more serious effort to engage
these issues would require a process involving a representative techni-
cal and industry group. 245
There is little in the Comcast Order to provide guidance for future
cases. For example, Comcast used a form of Deep Packet Inspection
(DPI), a technique that allows network operators to read the contents
of individual data packets as they pass across the network. 246 DPI
technologies are controversial because of the level of control they po-
tentially give the network operator. 247 Network operators can use
these mechanisms to target advertising based on user behavior; such
targeting is rapidly becoming a controversial practice. 248 The ability
of network operators to see the entire contents of the messages they
carry has generated privacy concerns. Even so, DPI can serve as a le-
gitimate mechanism for managing network traffic. 249 It is not, in all
cases, an "unreasonable" technique. The FCC decision, however, sug-
gested that it might be.250 Because the FCC chose an ad-hoc, case-by-
case, adjudicative approach to the network-neutrality problem, it re-
mains unclear whether the Commission will more broadly impose
fines and other sanctions on uses of DPI in the future.
There is room for vigorous debate about whether certain net-
work-management practices represent unacceptable discrimination or
merely necessary and neutral traffic engineering. As an expert regula-
tory agency, the FCC is qualified to engage in this analysis. It can only
do so, however, by developing a full record and considering the issues
squarely. The narrow and haphazard record in the Comcast case is
242 See Comcast Order, supra note 2, at 13,054, para. 45.
243 See id. at 13,054 n.212.
244 See id.; see also Paul Ohm, The Rise and Fall of Invasive ISP Surveillance, 2009 U. ILL. L.
REV. 1417, 1439 n.l15 (discussing the IETF's comments on the RST packet mechanism
that Comcast used). Comcast used a variety of different technical mechanisms, some of
which were more problematic than others.
245 See Weiser, supra note 230, at 34.
246 See id. at 31; Werbach, supra note 36, at 92-94.
247 See Werbach, supra note 26, at 119.
248 See Ohm, supra note 244, at 1433-34.
249 See Werbach, supra note 36, at 92; see also SAILESH KUMAR ET AL., ADVANCED ALGO-
RITHMS FOR FAST AND SCALABLE DEEP PACKET INSPECTION 81, 82 (Dec. 2006) ("Deep packet
inspection is becoming increasingly important as a means to classify and control traffic
based on the content, applications, and subscribers."); Cisco Sys., Inc., Deploying Premium
Services Using Cisco Service Control Technology, available at http://www.democraticme-
dia.org/files/pdf/CiscoPremiumServices.pdf (last visitedJan. 20, 2010) (promoting DPI as
a way to increase "subscriber and application awareness" and meet customer demand for
premium services).
250 See Comcast Order, supra note 2, at 13,055.
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insufficient. Only through a rulemaking procedure that allows it to
gather all the necessary information can the Commission be certain of
discharging its duties properly. And such a proceeding (or proceed-
ings) must start with a solid jurisdictional foundation.
III
FINDING A HOME FOR THE INTERNET
Unless it intends to reverse its post-Brand X course of dumping
all broadband services into the Title I bucket, the FCC must take seri-
ously the implications of its choice. As explained below, the FCC
should declare regulation of broadband Internet access necessary as
ancillary to its obligations under sections 251 and 256 of the Commu-
nications Act.2 51 The Commission could use this authority for ongo-
ing efforts to promote open access and standards-based
interconnection. A careful reading of the Communications Act dem-
onstrates that these two core obligations of telecommunications-ser-
vice providers will not be met if broadband-access providers can avoid
regulation. Tide I cannot mean Title 0. If the agency is to implement
the information-services classification consistently, it must give some
concrete meaning to the regulatory obligations of such services.
The FCC's mistake was to anchor Internet law in the part of the
Communications Act that mentions the Internet. Section 230 may be
a congressional delegation to develop policy, but it was a delegation
for the limited purpose of preventing intermediary liability. 25 2 Regu-
lators must honestly confront the reality that Congress did not create
a national Internet policy in 1996.253 A new policy regime to promote
open access and interconnection for Internet infrastructure requires a
different foundation. Fortunately, such a foundation exists. If the In-
ternet is consuming legacy communications and media industries,
then Internet policy is the new telecommunications policy. The cen-
251 The FCC did mention section 256 in the Comcast Order, but only as one subsidiary
justification in its shotgun list of provisions other than section 230 supporting its jurisdic-
tional claim. See id. at 13,039, para. 19. That single reference does not do justice to the
importance of section 256 in defining interconnection as a central directive for FCC In-
ternet policy, nor does it address the relationship of section 256 to section 251.
252 See supra text accompanying notes 148-58.
253 See supra Part II.A. The fact that the term "Internet" appears only twice out of
almost 750,000 words in the Telecommunications Act suggests that Internet-based services
were at best an afterthought in the exceptionally detailed regime that Congress spelled
out. See H. Russell Frisby, Jr. & David A. Irwin, The First Great Telecom Debate of the 21st
Century, 15 CoMMLAw CONSPECTUS 373, 377 (2007). The term appears only once in the
text of the massive FCC interconnection order implementing the local-competition por-
tions of the Act. See Local Competition Ruling, supra note 199; In re Implementation of the
Local Competition Provisions in the Telecommunications Act of 1996 & Interconnection
Between Local Exch. Carriers & Commercial Mobile Radio Serv. Providers, 11 F.C.C.R.
15,499, 15,878, para. 756 (Aug. 1, 1996) (first report & order).
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tral provisions of the Communications Act must morph to apply to
Internet-based systems.
A. Ancillary Jurisdiction
The concept of ancillary jurisdiction under the Communications
Act was established by the Supreme Court in the 1968 case United
States v. Southwestern Cable Co.254 In Southwestern Cable, the FCC sought
to regulate cable-television service, which was in its earliest stages of
commercial development. 255 Cable posed a conundrum under the
Communications Act. It was delivered over wires, like telephone ser-
vice, but provided one-way delivery of video content to many subscrib-
ers, like broadcasting. It fit neither the common-carrier definitions of
Title II of the Act nor the broadcast definitions of Title III, despite
obviously having attributes of both. 256 And even though it was then a
small industry, cable had the potential to significantly alter the market
for video programming, which the FCC had regulated under its pub-
lic-interest standard since the dawn of television. 257
The FCC needed a hook to assert jurisdiction over cable. To
reach that goal, it used a two-step process. First, the Commission
found that cable was within its primary statutory grant of authority
under section 152(a) of the Act, which allows the FCC to regulate "all
interstate and foreign communication by wire or radio.'' 258 Second,
the FCC invoked section 303(r) of the Act, which allows the Commis-
sion to issue "such rules and regulations and prescribe such restric-
tions and conditions, not inconsistent with law," 259 as "public
convenience, interest, or necessity requires."260 The FCC also refer-
enced section 154(i), which provides that "[t] he Commission may per-
form any and all acts, make such rules and regulations, and issue such
orders, not inconsistent with [the Communications Act], as may be
necessary in the execution of its functions. '" 2 61
254 392 U.S. 157 (1968). Ancillary jurisdiction is not limited to the FCC. The tradi-
tional version of the concept applies to federal agencies' power to adjudicate those state-
law claims that are inextricably related to federal claims. See Commodity Futures Trading
Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 851-53 (1986); Penina Michlin, Note, The Broadcast Flag
and the Scope of the FCC's Ancillary Jurisdiction: Protecting the Digital Future, 20 BERKELEv TECH.
L.J. 907, 914-16 (2005).
255 See Sw. Cable, 392 U.S. at 167.
256 See id. at 164.
257 See id. at 175-80. The Commission's assessment was accurate. Today, cable, along
with direct-broadcast satellite service, represents over eighty-five percent of the video mar-
ket. See In re Annual Assessment of the Status of Competition in the Market for the Deliv-
ery of Video Programming, Twelfth Annual Report, 21 F.C.C.R. 2503, 2617 (Feb. 10,
2006).
258 47 U.S.C. § 152(a) (2006).
259 Id. § 303(r).
260 Id. § 303.
261 Id. § 154(i).
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As the Supreme Court affirmed in Southwestern Cable, these provi-
sions give the FCC authority to take steps "reasonably ancillary to the
effective performance of the Commission's various responsibilities. '" 262
Regulation of cable was deemed reasonably ancillary to the statutorily
defined regulation of broadcasting because an unregulated cable in-
dustry could prevent effective achievement of those statutory
mandates.263
Ancillary authority has limits. In two successor cases in the 1970s,
Midwest Video 1264 and Midwest Video J1,265 the Supreme Court clarified
the boundaries of the authority carved out in Southwestern Cable. Mid-
west Video I upheld FCC rules requiring cable operators to originate
their own programming. 266 Midwest Video II, however, rejected FCC
requirements that cable providers offer access to unaffiliated content
providers and noncommercial users.267 The Court in Midwest Video H
found these requirements tantamount to common-carriage obliga-
tions.268 Section 153(10) of the Act expressly stated that "a person
engaged in ... broadcasting shall not ... be deemed a common car-
rier."269 Although the FCC rules in question might have furthered
statutory goals of the Communications Act, they required cable opera-
tors to do something that the FCC could not legally require of broad-
casters. Therefore, the Court held, those rules could not possibly be
"reasonably ancillary" to FCC regulation of broadcasting.270
As defined in Southwestern Cable and refined in Midwest Video, an-
cillary authority requires the expansion of the FCC's jurisdiction to be
necessary to meet statutory obligations.271 In the case of cable televi-
sion, the FCC took the position that the statutory scheme for regulat-
ing wireless broadcasters would be threatened if analogous wired
262 Sw. Cable, 392 U.S. at 178. Weiser describes ancillary jurisdiction as "a cousin to the
interstitial authority of the federal courts to develop the basic principles embodied in com-
mon law-like statutes such as the Sherman Antitrust Act or the Copyright Act." Weiser,
supra note 7, at 51.
263 See Sw. Cable, 392 U.S. at 177. Congress later added Tide VI, explicitly regulating
cable and supplanting the FCC's earlier rules. See Cable Communications Policy Act of
1984, Pub. L. No. 98-549, 98 Stat. 2779 (codified at 47 U.S.C. §§ 521-611).
264 United States v. Midwest Video Corp. (Midwest Video 1), 406 U.S. 649 (1972).
265 FCC v. Midwest Video Corp. (Midwest Video I), 440 U.S. 689 (1979).
266 See Midwest Video I, 406 U.S. at 667-70. The case produced a splintered opinion.
Concurring, ChiefJustice Warren Burger stated that the order "strains the outer limits" of
FCC jurisdiction. Id. at 676 (Burger, C.J., concurring in result).
267 See Midwest Video II, 440 U.S. at 695-96.
268 See id.
269 47 U.S.C. § 153(10) (2006).
270 See Midwest Video II, 440 U.S. at 708-09.
271 The distinction between Southwestern Cable and Midwest Video I was that the former
allowed the FCC to protect the existence of the regulated industry (broadcasting), and the
latter allowed the FCC to promulgate rules to effectuate the established statutory objectives
of broadcast regulation. See Crawford, supra note 6, at 731-33.
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systems were wholly unregulated. 272 In other words, what mattered
was what the statute said about the traditional regulated service, not
what, if anything, it said about the new service.2 73 Cable could be reg-
ulated because it was a service within the FCC's general grant ofjuris-
diction that was likely to have a significant impact on services subject
to specific FCC regulatory obligations. But when the FCC attempted
to decouple the regulation of cable from the regulation of broadcast-
ing, the Court overturned it.274
In its 1971 Computerldecision, the FCC declined to regulate data-
processing services but left open the possibility of doing so under an-
cillary jurisdiction. 275 The Commission ultimately chose to maintain
the unregulated status of what became enhanced or information ser-
vices, but it noted that it could have taken a different tack if competi-
tive dynamics in those markets were different. 276 However, Computer I
did promulgate rules restricting regulated common carriers from en-
tering the unregulated data-processing market. 277 The Second Cir-
cuit upheld these provisions in GTE Service Corp. v. FCC even though
the Communications Act gave the FCC no authority over such
services. 278
In recent years, the FCC has asserted ancillary authority in several
cases, including issues such as closed-captioning requirements for
broadcasters, regulation of instant messaging, and a universal service
fund.279 As Phil Weiser notes, "the FCC's conception of this authority
272 See United States v. Sw. Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 173-78 (1968). Whether the Com-
mission was right is another story. For example, the FCC regulates indecent content on
broadcast television but not on cable, even though the two platforms compete. See United
States v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803 (2000); Robert Corn-Revere, Can Broad-
cast Indecency Regulations Be Extended to Cable Television and Satellite Radio?, PROGRESS ON
POINT (Progress & Freedom Found., Wash., D.C.), May 2005. Though this may not be a
level playing field, it has not made the FCC's content rules untenable.
273 In Midwest Video II, the fatal flaw in the challenged FCC order was that it expressly
contradicted the mandates of the statute for the legacy service by imposing common-car-
rier-like restrictions on broadcasters. See Midwest Video II, 440 U.S. at 708-09.
274 See id.
275 See In re Regulatory & Pol'y Problems Presented by the Interdependence of Com-
puter & Commc'n Servs. & Facilities, 28 F.C.C.2d 267, 268 (1971) (final decision & order)
[hereinafter Regulatory & Pol'y Problems Final Order] ("Since we are not proposing, at
this time, to regulate data processing, as such, a discussion of the extent of our jurisdiction
with respect thereto is neither relevant nor necessary .
276 See id.
277 See id. AT&T was prohibited from doing so under a 1956 consent decree, but
other, smaller, incumbent carriers such as GTE could offer data processing through sepa-
rate affiliates. See Regulatory & Pol'y Problems Presented by the Interdependence of Com-
puter & Commc'n Servs. & Facilities, 28 F.C.C.2d 291, 298-99 & n.2 (1970).
278 See GTE Serv. Corp. v. FCC, 474 F.2d 724, 730-32 (2d Cir. 1973).
279 See Rural Tel. Coal. v. FCC, 838 F.2d 1307, 1310 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (universal ser-
vice); In re Applications for Consent to the Transfer of Control of Licenses & Section 214
Authorizations by Time Warner Inc. & Am. Online, Inc., Transferors, to AOL Time
Warner, Inc., Transferee, 16 F.C.C.R. 6547, 6610, para. 148 (2001) (mem. opinion & or-
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is hardly a model of clarity or consistency."280 The forty-year-old
cable-television decisions remain the benchmarks for understanding
the contours of ancillary jurisdiction. 28 1
The FCC's latest foray into ancillary jurisdiction involved the so-
called broadcast flag. In 2003, the FCC mandated that manufacturers
of television receivers or other devices capable of receiving digital
broadcast TV signals include broadcast-flag capability in their de-
vices. 282 The broadcast flag was designed to prevent unauthorized
copying of digital programming. Broadcasters and content producers
argued that, without strong protections against copying, digital con-
tent would not be widely distributed.283 The FCC was eager to pro-
mote the switch to digital television. It concluded that a content-
protection system was important to ensure sufficient digital program-
ming to entice consumers to purchase the new digital sets. 284 The
jurisdictional problem was that the broadcast flag applied to hardware.
The flag regulated television sets, not the television broadcasters cov-
ered under Title III of the Act.28 5
The FCC tried and ultimately failed to defend the broadcast flag
as an exercise of ancillary jurisdiction.2 8 6 The Commission's argu-
ment was that FCC's statutory authority included not only communi-
cations but also all incidental "instrumentalities, facilities, apparatus,
and services" used for the "receipt, forwarding, and delivery of com-
munications. '28 7 The District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals
disagreed.288 In American Library Ass'n v. FCC, the court concluded
der) [hereinafter AOL-Time Warner Merger Order] (instant messaging); In re Implemen-
tation of Video Description of Video Programming, 15 F.C.C.R. 15,230, 15,256, para. 67
(2000) (report & order), rev'd, Motion Picture Ass'n of Am., Inc. v. FCC, 309 F.3d 796
(D.C. Cir. 2002) (video descriptions).
280 Weiser, supra note 7, at 49.
281 See id. at 52.
282 See In re Digital Broadcast Content Protection, 18 F.C.C.R. 23,550, 23,552, para.4
(Nov. 4, 2003) (report & order & further notice of proposed rulemaking) [hereinafter
Broadcast Flag Order].
283 See Werbach, supra note 17, at 60-63; John Borland, FCC Nears Vote on TV 'Broadcast
Flag', CNET NEWS, Oct. 28, 2003, http://news.com.com/FCC+nears+vote+on+TV+
broadcast+flag'/2100-1028_3-5097927.html.
284 See Broadcast Flag Order, supra note 282, at 23,552; Werbach, supra note 17, at 63.
285 The FCC's order applied to all "Demodulator Products," which were essentially all
devices able to display a digital-television broadcast signal on a screen. See Broadcast Flag
Order, supra note 282, at 23,565; see also 47 C.F.R. § 73.9000(f) (2008) (defining "covered
demodulator product" as "a product that is required... to comply with the demodulator
compliance requirements, and to be manufactured in accordance with the demodulator
robustness requirements"); id. § 73.9002(b) (prohibiting sale or distribution in interstate
commerce of "covered demodulator products" except in accordance with demodulator
compliance and robustness requirements).
286 See Broadcast Flag Order, supra note 282, at 23,562-63.
287 47 U.S.C. § 153(33) (2006); Am. Library Ass'n v. FCC, 406 F.3d 689, 703 (D.C. Cir.
2005) (quoting § 153(33)).
288 See Am. Library Ass'n, 406 F.3d at 692.
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that, because the broadcast flag operated after a digital-broadcast
transmission arrived at a television set, the statutory provision did not
cover the flag.28 9
The American Library Ass'n court struck down the broadcast flag,
but it did not narrow the scope of the FCC's ancillary jurisdiction. As
the court noted, "[t]he Commission's general jurisdictional grant
under Title I plainly encompasses the regulation of apparatus that can
receive television broadcast content, but only while those apparatus
are engaged in the process of receiving a television broadcast."290 It is
tempting to characterize the broadcast flag as the FCC overreaching
toward the Internet.291 However, the case is more properly seen as a
straightforward application of the Midwest Video II doctrine that ancil-
lary jurisdiction cannot produce a result inconsistent with express stat-
utory language. 292
B. Internet Communications as Ancillary to Interconnection
1. Internet Communications Services
The Wireline Broadband Order concerned providers of integrated
telecommunications and information services. 293 Broadband-access
services such as DSL and cable modem clearly involve both a pure
transportation pipe and a suite of data-processing functionality. 294
The trouble is that providers do not offer the two components sepa-
rately.295 The FCC decided to treat the bundles as information ser-
vices. 296  This conclusion effectively placed "pure" information
services, which are, according to the statutory definition, capabilities
offered "via telecommunications," 297 into the same category as "inte-
grated" information services, which include those very telecommuni-
cations capabilities.
For example, the search engine Google transforms information
and delivers results via telecommunications networks, making it an in-
289 See id. at 703-04.
290 Id. at 692.
291 See Crawford, supra note 6, at 712-14.
292 SeeMotion Picture Ass'n of Am., Inc. v. FCC, 309 F.3d 796, 798-99 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
The video-description case similarly involved a proposed FCC rule that contravened ex-
press limits set out in the statute. See FCC v. Midwest Video Corp. (Midwest Video I), 440
U.S. 689, 708-09 (1979).
293 See Wireline Broadband Order, supra note 32, at 14,860.
294 See id. at 14,860-61.
295 See id.
296 Interestingly, this was the opposite of the FCC's original decision in Computer L
There, the Commission held that a service of a common carrier that included both com-
munications and data processing would be treated as regulated communications. That
"contamination" approach generated significant difficulties in application. See generally
Cannon, supra note 32.
297 47 U.S.C. § 153(20) (2006).
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formation service.2 98 When a user accesses Google through a dial-up
Internet-service provider, that ISP purchases access from a regulated
telecommunications provider.29 9 In other words, the physical network
operator is classified differently than the service offered over the net-
work. When that same user connects to Google over a broadband
connection, however, the situation changes. The FCC now classifies
broadband-access providers as information services, the very same cat-
egory that applies to Google.
In the Comcast Order, the FCC did not define the class of informa-
tion-service providers that it thought it could regulate to promote an
open Internet. The Commission adjudicated a dispute involving a sin-
gle provider, Comcast. Under the Commission's case-by-case ap-
proach, the scope as well as the contents of the requirement could
presumably be considered each time.
A better approach would be to define a new category as a subset
of information services. There is plainly no need for the FCC to adopt
rules for all information services. The overwhelming majority of ser-
vices that involve data-processing capabilities across telecommunica-
tions networks are vastly different from the network operators that the
FCC regulates.300 For example, there is no policy reason to develop
rules under the Telecommunications Act for Google's search engine
or Amazon.com's online bookstore.30 1 The FCC approach of classify-
ing enhanced or information services primarily to wall them off from
regulation remains a good one.
Two specific kinds of information services should be within FCC
jurisdiction as Internet communications services. One includes those
information services so identical to telecommunications services as to
make the distinction purely an invitation for arbitrage. AT&T's "fake
VoIP" backbone service is an example: even though it involved some
mechanical protocol conversion, it was effectively a telecommunica-
tions service.30 2
Having a class of information services that straddles the boundary
in this way would eliminate uncertainty about where a service falls.
Manipulating offerings to fall on the information-services side of the
divide would not itself eliminate regulatory obligations. This category
would not apply to all information services that are similar to tradi-
tional regulated services. There are many VoIP offerings, for exam-
ple, that differ in significant ways from circuit-switched telephone
298 See id.
299 See Cannon, supra note 38, at 56.
300 See Cannon, supra note 32, at 188 (giving examples of enhanced services).
301 That is not to say that no regulation would be appropriate. Antitrust rules may
apply, for example.
302 See Petition for Declaratory Ruling, supra note 48, at 7465.
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service, even if they compete with it.303 Applying the same obligations
to those services could put a damper on competition and innova-
tion.30 4 Internet communications services would consider only those
services that were indistinguishable from regulated services or clearly
designed to evade regulatory obligations. 30 5
The second category of Internet communications services would
be broadband-access platforms. Services that integrate telecommuni-
cations and information services in order to provide end-users with
access to the Internet are hybrids. They can remain in the informa-
tion-services bucket, so long as they are carved out as a special case
over which the FCC can exercise ancillary jurisdiction. This narrow
approach would avoid the need to impose the full panoply of com-
mon-carrier obligations or cable-TV rules on broadband-access provid-
ers. As discussed above, this approach would be fully consistent with
the real congressional intent behind section 230 of the 1996 Act. 30 6
At the same time, such an approach would acknowledge that the
FCC's path of declaring all broadband-access networks as information
services created a significant hole in the regulatory scheme.
Broadband access is not a "pure" information service. Instead, it
is telecommunications transport integrated with data-processing func-
tionality.30 7 The major companies that offer it are regulated tele-
phone, cable, and wireless providers. 308 Even if one accepts the FCC's
conclusion that the broadband-access bundle should be treated for
regulatory purposes as an information service, it is a different kind of
information service than Amazon.com or Wikipedia offers. Especially
for a carrier such as Verizon or AT&T, the information-service classifi-
cation is favorable because it means a net reduction in regulatory obli-
gations, since they would otherwise be Title II common carriers. But
treating them as information-service providers subject to limited Title
I obligations would still subject them to far fewer rules than the
alternative.
The debate today over regulation of information services ignores
the requirements established in Southwestern Cable and Midwest Video.
The FCC's analysis in the Comcast Order focused on the nature of
broadband Internet-access service and online applications, but it did
303 See Crawford, supra note 6, at 700 n.17.
304 See id. at 724.
305 See GTE Serv. Corp. v. FCC, 474 F.2d 724, 733 (2d Cir. 1973) (rejecting ancillary
jurisdiction when it was clear that a class of providers was not structured to avoid
regulation).
306 See supra Part II.A; see also Crawford, supra note 6, at 704-05.
307 Wireline Broadband Order, supra note 32, at 14,860.
308 See supra note 49.
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not consider regulated services that might be affected.3 09 Comcast
critics asserted that the broadband operator's network-management
techniques were adopted to protect its cable-video revenues against
competition from Internet-based P2P delivery. 310 The FCC, however,
did not use this argument as a basis for its decision. It found Coin-
cast's network-management practices improper regardless of their
motivation because they were not necessary to achieve the company's
legitimate technical requirements. 31' The FCC's goal in asserting an-
cillary authority was to protect the integrity of the unregulated In-
ternet, based on the language it found in section 230 and
elsewhere.3 12
This is not the analysis the Supreme Court prescribed in South-
western Cable and Midwest Video. Under the cable cases, the characteris-
tics of the new service are relevant only to determine whether it fits
under the broad grant of authority in section 152(a). Once that
prong is satisfied, the next question is what the effects will be on ex-
isting regulated services. If the new service could prevent achieve-
ment of statutory goals associated with the established service, the
third prong is to evaluate the proposed regulation for consistency with
the FCC's existing rules. By using the impact on unregulated services
as the basis for new regulation of incumbents, the FCC had it exactly
backwards. 3 13
The fact that language about the Internet appears in the Act-
unlike cable service at the time of Southwestern Cable-is not material.
Section 230, as described above, is not a concrete regulatory scheme
equivalent to the extensive set of Title III broadcast rules at issue in
Southwestern Cable, nor is it even a command to achieve the policy
objectives the FCC identified in the Comcast Order3 14 The logic of an-
cillary authority is that there must be some primary authority at
309 See Comcast Order, supra note 2, at 13,045-46. The FCC did note in passing that
because Comcast's information service interconnects with the public-switched telephone
network, it affects the market for telecommunications services, as required under section
256. See id. at 13,039.
310 See id. at 13,030.
311 See id. at 13,054.
312 See id. at 13,034.
313 The Commission did note in the Comcast Order that Comcast's practices could "have
the effect of shifting traffic to other carrier's telecommunications networks." Id. at 13,039,
para. 19. Its primary focus, however, was on the potential impacts of broadband network
management practices on the Internet ecosystem. And even as a subsidiary justification,
the FCC's traffic-shifting argument is something of a stretch. Other telecommunications
networks and their customers were not complaining about Comcast's practices. Any In-
ternet network-management practice can have the effect of changing traffic patterns on
other networks because the Internet is fundamentally interconnected.
314 See supra Part II.A.
2010]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
risk. 315 Moreover, as developed in Midwest Video II, the ancillary au-
thority must track the contours of those primary mandates. 31 6
There are no actual mandates within section 230. On the FCC's
reading, the primary content of a statutory command would be devel-
oped under ancillary authority. This reading makes no sense. Such a
reading would give general policy pronouncements in a regulatory
statute effectively the same status as specific mandates. 317 The deci-
sion of whether to impose obligations, or simply to express an objec-
tive, is properly the domain of Congress, not the administrative
agency.
An analysis faithful to Supreme Court precedent would proceed
differently. There is a basis for bringing broadband-access services
within the Communications Act but with a different foundation than
the one the Commission used in the Comcast Order. Internet-based
services clearly satisfy the first prong of Southwestern Cable. They are
"'communication [s] by wire or radio'" that cross state lines.318
The second prong is met as well. In Southwestern Cable, the prob-
lem was that a new unregulated service (cable) could mimic and
therefore competitively undermine a regulated service (broadcast-
ing).319 FCC exercise of ancillary authority was deemed necessary to
preserve the statutory public-interest mandates on broadcasters. 320
The analogous issue today is whether new, unregulated broadband-
Internet services would have the same effect. 32' The answer is unques-
tionably yes.
The rise of broadband-Internet services and content threaten
FCC statutory obligations in two ways: (1) unregulated services can
315 See supra notes 258-78 and accompanying text.
316 See FCC v. Midwest Video Corp. (Midwest Video I1), 440 U.S. 689, 708-09 (1979).
317 Language from the general provisions of Title I of the Act can be used in support
of ancillary jurisdiction. Law professorJohn Blevins made this argument in a comment to
the FCC. See Ex Parte Letter of John Blevins Regarding the Commission's Ancillary juris-
diction, Before Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n (Jul. 17, 2008), available at http://fjallfoss.fcc.
gov/ecfs/document/view?id=6520034634. However, the cases Blevins cites tie back to
Southwestern Cable, where jurisdiction rested primarily on the impacts on regulated broad-
cast services. The Title I provisions are not meaningless but neither are they equivalent to
the statutory commands of Titles II, III, and VI.
318 United States v. Sw. Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 167-69 (1968) (quoting 47 U.S.C.
§ 152(a) (2006)).
319 See id. at 175-77.
320 See id. at 180-81.
321 The situation today is akin to the one the FCC faced in the early days of the televi-
sion industry. The Communications Act granted the FCC the power to regulate broadcast-
ers. See 47 U.S.C. § 301. The Act clcarly covered technical rules for spectrum licensing but
did not expressly address business arrangements. In NBC v. US, the Supreme Court up-
held the FCC's Chain Broadcasting Regulations on the grounds that "Congress was acting
in a field of regulation which was both new and dynamic" and, "[iun the context of the
developing problems to which it was directed, the Act gave the Commission not niggardly
but expansive powers." See Nat'l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 219 (1943).
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mimic and compete with regulated telecommunications services, and
(2) simultaneously, those regulated services can either escape from
regulation or harm competition in the markets higher up. Either out-
come would belie congressional objectives. The FCC cannot carry out
its statutory duties for telecommunications service providers if infor-
mation services remain a content-less regulatory gray area. 322 For ex-
ample, if Verizon or Cablevision refused to allow independent-
application and content providers to reach customers through their
pipes or discriminated against unaffiliated providers on their plat-
form, the substantive provisions of Title II of the Act would ultimately
be meaningless.
The FCC should not try to stop the "Digital Broadband Migra-
tion," to borrow a phrase from former FCC Chairman Michael Pow-
ell.3 23 On the contrary, the Commission should cheer the substitution
of closed network silos with a converged, layered, interconnected uni-
versal-data network. 324 The perception that regulatory concern with
the Internet will somehow contaminate the FCC is a residue of the
CDA debate and the early work of "cyber-exceptionalists" such as John
Perry Barlow, David Johnson, and David Post.325 It is no longer 1996.
We can now see that future telecommunications and broadcast net-
works will all be based on Internet-like data networking technologies.
Yet we can also see that classic policy concerns of ensuring af-
fordability, ubiquity, reliability, interoperability, innovation, invest-
ment, and consumer protection will remain important. The
challenge for the FCC today is not how to keep the Internet out but
how to bring it in. 326
322 Cf GTE Serv. Corp. v. FCC, 474 F.2d. 724, 731 (2d Cir. 1973) ("[E]ven absent
explicit reference in the statute, the expansive power of the Commission in the electronic
communications field includes the jurisdictional authority to regulate carrier activities in
an area as intimately related to the communications industry as that of computer services,
where such activities may substantially affect the efficient provision of reasonably priced
communications service.").
323 Michael K. Powell, Comm'r, Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, The Great Digital Broad-
band Migration (Dec. 8, 2000), available at http://www.fcc.gov/Speeches/Powell/2000/
spmkp003.html.
324 See Werbach, Layered Mode, supra note 69, at 54-64.
325 See generally David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders-The Rise of Law in
Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REv. 1367 (1996) (arguing that Cyberspace demands a different
regulatory approach because it transcends the geographic borders and physical markers
upon which traditional law relies); John Perry Barlow, A Declaration of the Independence
of Cyberspace, Feb. 8, 1996, available at http://w2.eff.org/Censorship/Internet_
censorship-bills/barlow_- 0296.declaration (declaring the Internet independent from the
regulatory authority of world governments).
326 See Weiser, supra note 230, at 2-6.
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2. GTE Service Corp. v. FCC
The court decision most directly applicable to the ancillaryjuris-
diction analysis for Internet communications services is GTE Service
Corp. v. FCC, a 1973 decision in which the Second Circuit upheld cer-
tain rules that the FCC had promulgated in its Computer II decision. 327
Though nearly forty years old, the case provides a good blueprint for
FCC authority. The situation today is analogous to the one the Com-
mission confronted in the late 1960s, when computers first began to
have a significant relationship with the telephone network. The two
sets of rules challenged in GTE map directly to the two main kinds of
Internet-based information services today.
The Computer II rules governed the behavior of common carriers
when acting as providers of data processing, even though data-
processing providers were not regulated under the Communications
Act. 328 The Court of Appeals had no difficulty upholding this action:
"The burgeoning data processing activities of the common carriers
pose, in the view of the Commission, a threat to efficient public com-
munications services at reasonable prices and hence regulation isjusti-
fied under its broad rule-making authority."3 29
In 1971, there was no "information service" category in the stat-
ute. Had there been, the FCC's Computer II rules would have consti-
tuted regulation of telecommunications carriers who were acting as
information-services providers-the exact parallel to today's broad-
band-access providers. The FCC cannot have less authority to regulate
something specified in the statute than a noncategory.
Even the portion of GTE that found that the FCC exceeded its
authority supports the exercise of ancillary jurisdiction over Internet
communications services today. The court invalidated the Computer II
rules that sought to regulate the behavior of the structurally separate
data-processing affiliates that the FCC required common carriers to
establish. 330 The FCC was concerned that these new affiliates would
have an unfair advantage if they could use the brands of, or purchase
services from, their regulated parents. The problem was that the affili-
ates were pure data-processing companies, and the FCC had itself de-
clared that it would not regulate data processing at the time. 331 The
FCC's justification for the challenged rules was based on antitrust the-
ory, not the requirements of the Communications Act. As the court
327 See GTE, 474 F.2d at 729-35.
328 See Regulatory & Pol'y Problems Final Order, supra note 275, at 268-69.
329 GTE, 474 F.2d at 730.
330 See id. at 733.
331 See id. ("[The FCC's] concern here therefore is not for the communications market
which Congress has entrusted to its care, but for data processing which is beyond its charge
and which the Commission itself has announced it declines to regulate.").
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noted, the data-processing affiliates were not means to escape regula-
tion but corporate vehicles that the FCC itself required. 332 The Com-
mission could not then turn around and treat them as creatures of the
regulated carrier.
The circumstances today are quite different. What in 1971 was a
tiny, formative data-processing industry is today a vast information-ser-
vices marketplace. The GTE court based its action on the FCC's prior
decision to avoid exercise of ancillary jurisdiction over data process-
ing. 333 Nevertheless, the FCC expressly stated at that time that, "[i]f
there should develop significant changes in the structure of the data
processing industry, or, if abuses emerge which require the exercise of
corrective action by the Commission," it would reevaluate the regula-
tory status of the market.
3 34
If the FCC today finds that the broadband-access market, despite
involving information services, requires actions to enforce the man-
dates of the Communications Act, it can use that finding as a basis for
oversight of Internet communications services. Unlike the invalidated
rules in GTE, these FCC policies would derive from the impact on the
Commission's ability to carry out its statutory duties, not on general
antitrust concerns about the performance of the information-services
market.
Whenever an administrative agency draws a new dividing line be-
tween regulated and unregulated services, it creates two possibilities:
unregulated companies may become regulated for the first time, and
regulated companies may escape regulation. The GTE court allowed
the FCC to act in the latter case but not in the former. 335 Imposing
rules on data-processing affiliates would have expanded the base of
regulated entities. Such a move could be justified, as it was in South-
western Cable, but it stands to reason that the bar should be high absent
express congressional mandates. With broadband access, the Com-
mission faces the same dichotomy. It can properly distinguish rules
regulating pure information services for the first time from those
maintaining limited oversight over integrated providers.
3. Limits on FCC Authority
As Justice Scalia noted in his dissent in Brand X, ancillary jurisdic-
tion without sufficient constraints renders the statute meaningless:
This is a wonderful illustration of how an experienced agency can
(with some assistance from credulous courts) turn statutory con-
straints into bureaucratic discretions .... Under its undefined and
332 See id.
33 See id.
334 See Regulatory & Pol'y Problems Final Order, supra note 275, at 268.
335 See GTE, 474 F.2d at 733.
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sparingly used "ancillary" powers, the Commission might conclude
that it can order cable companies to "unbundle" the telecommuni-
cations component of cable-modem service. And presto, Title II will
then apply to them, because they will finally be "offering" telecom-
munications service! 336
The majority in Brand X found that the FCC had sufficiently justified
its appeal to ancillary authority.3 37 Still, Justice Scalia's criticism does
have some bite. Consistent with Midwest Video II, the Commission
must constrain its actions so that the outcome is not flatly contrary to
the statute. 338 The ultimate decisions remain with Congress and
should not be usurped by a bureaucratic agency.3 3 9
Unlike the broadcast/common-carriage distinction, nothing in
the Telecommunications Act expressly forbids imposition of any regu-
lation on information-service providers. The Act lists obligations for
providers of telecommunications service, such as the requirement to
interconnect. 340 It distinguishes telecommunications service from in-
formation service 341 but offers no particular requirements for those
information services. The assumption has been that information ser-
vices were designed as an inherently unregulated zone. Members of
the information-service industry often describe information services as
"Title I" services, as if any regulation must come under that section of
the Act.3 4
2
However, Congress issued no such pronouncement in the statu-
tory text. The term "information service" is defined in section 153
(part of Title I), but so are "telecommunications service," "common
carrier," "broadcasting," and all the other major statutory catego-
ries.3 43 Title II includes rules primarily applicable to telecommunica-
tions carriers, but it is not exclusive.3 44 That Congress chose to
establish a new category for information services supports the notion
336 Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 1013-14
(2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
337 See id. at 1000-03.
338 See FCC v. Midwest Video Corp. (Midwest Video I1), 440 U.S. 689, 704-09 (1979).
339 See Brand Y. 545 U.S. at 1005 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Midwest Video II, 440 U.S. at
704-09. The specific scenario Justice Scalia painted, however, would conflict with the
Court's holding in Midwest Video I. See 440 U.S. at 704-09. Just as the FCC could not
"change the facts" to regulate cable companies as common carriers in that case, it could
not do so in Brand Y, 545 U.S. at 1014 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Common-carrier regulation
is still limited to common carriers under the statutory scheme. See id. at 1002.
340 See 47 U.S.C. § 251(a)(1) (2006).
341 See id. § 153(20), (46).
342 SeeNUECHTERLEIN &WEISER, supra note 6, at 213 ("[I]ndustry participants often use
'Title I' (as in a 'Tide I service') as a shorthand for 'deregulated' and 'Tide II' as a short-
hand for 'regulated.'").
343 See 47 U.S.C. § 153.
344 See id. § 201.
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that some regulatory obligations would be consistent with the congres-
sional mandate.3 45
The question then is what should govern the FCC rules adopted
under ancillary authority.346 The FCC in the Comcast Order pointed to
a hodgepodge of provisions of the Communications Act that offer no
clear limits on the contours of a Title I regime.3 47 Weiser argues for
an antitrust-like regime, on the ground that it is better suited to the
challenges of broadband access than the prophylactic regime of Title
11.348 The FCC need not go so far afield. A better option is right
there within the Act.
C. The Interconnection Mandates of Sections 251 and 256
1. The Statutory Scheme
Considering the structure of the Communications Act as a whole
reveals a coherent framework, which can encompass Internet commu-
nications services. Two core mandates of the statute would be injeop-
ardy if Internet communications services were not subject to ancillary
jurisdiction. FCC rules for Internet-based services would be ancillary
to these two provisions.
The statute is still called the Communications Act, but portions of
it were dramatically changed in the 1996 overhaul.3 49 In particular,
Congress added a new set of rules for the interconnected environ-
ment of competing providers that it envisioned would replace the
traditional environment of regulated common carriers.3 50 These
rules modified and expanded Title II of the original Act. Although
the title of the relevant section of the Act is still "Common Carriers,"
only the first of three parts describes common-carriage require-
ments. 351 Section 201, for example, requires common carriers (and
only common carriers) to furnish service "upon reasonable request"
and charge 'just and reasonable" rates.3 52 The rest of Title II, though,
has broader applicability and can therefore serve as a basis for rules
governing Internet-based communications.
345 If information services were intended to be wholly outside the statutory scheme,
their inclusion in the definitions section would be superfluous.
346 See Weiser, supra note 7, at 56 ("[A] Title I-based regime begins from the premise
that no regulation applies and that the FCC can develop any reasonable regulations that
are ancillary to its statutory mandate.").
347 See Comcast Order, supra note 2, at 13,036-44.
348 Weiser, supra note 7, at 65-66.
349 See NUECHTERLEIN & WEISER, supra note 6, at 69-113.
350 See 47 U.S.C. § 251 (2006).
351 See id. § 201. The definitien of a common carrier is circular: it is "any person en-
gaged as a common carrier for hire, in interstate or foreign communication." Id.
§ 153(10).
352 Id. § 201 (a)-(b).
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The general regulatory pronouncements governing telecommu-
nications networks are in Part II of Subchapter II of the Communica-
tions Act as codified, "Development of Competitive Markets. ' 353 The
substantive provisions that apply generally, notjust to incumbents, are
section 251 (requiring interconnection) ,354 and section 256 (requir-
ing coordination for interconnectivity) .355 The sections have a com-
mon theme of open interconnection. Providers of telecommunica-
tions services must interconnect, they must do so through open stan-
dards, and they must share infrastructure. There is, therefore, a clear
congressional vision to promote open, interconnected networks. 356
Moreover, although these requirements specifically apply to tele-
communications carriers, they are not limited in application to tele-
communications services. For example, Verizon is still a
telecommunications carrier even though it sometimes provides infor-
mation services. 35 7 So is Comcast, which is now one of the nation's
largest telephone companies. 358 Section 251 mandates interconnec-
tion of "facilities and equipment,"359 which in a digital environment
can be used to provide many different kinds of services. Section 256
declares a goal of promoting unfettered transmission for "users and
information providers,' 360 who depend on the transport capability
embedded in Internet communications services.
By limiting the scope of sections 251 and 256 to telecommunica-
tions carriers, Congress limited regulation of pure information-ser-
vices markets, such as instant messaging and social networks. 36' But
nothing suggests that Congress intended to limit openness of network
353 Id. §§ 251-61.
354 Id. § 251.
355 Id. § 256. Section 259 requires sharing of infrastructure with "qualifying carrier[s]"
but has limited applicability. Id. § 259(a).
356 See Motion Picture Ass'n of Am., Inc. v. FCC, 309 F.3d 796, 804 (D.C. Cir. 2002)
("Both the terms of § 1 and the case law amplifying it focus on the FCC's power to promote
the accessibility and universality of transmission . . . ."). In Motion Picture Ass'n of America,
the D.C. Circuit rejected the FCC's claim of ancillary jurisdiction to issue rules for televi-
sion video descriptions. Even that skeptical court recognized that there is a place for ancil-
lary authority in the area considered here. See id.
357 This is the significance of the statutory provision that, "A telecommunications car-
rier shall be treated as a common carrier under this chapter only to the extent that it is
engaged in providing telecommunications services." 47 U.S.C. § 153(44).
358 See Bob Fernandez, Comcast First-Quarter Revenue Up 5 Percent, PHILA. INQUIRER, May
1, 2009, LexisNexis Academic.
359 47 U.S.C. § 251 (a)(1).
360 Id. § 256(a) (2).
361 See generally Werbach, supra note 54 (discussing Internet backbone and application
interconnection). The FCC was able to impose interconnection obligations on AOL's in-
stant-messaging service in connection with its merger with Time Warner. See AOL-Time
Warner Merger Order, supra note 279, at 6603-04. There, however, the FCC had specific
statutory authority to review and impose conditions on mergers involving change of con-
trol over spectrum licenses. See id. at 6610-11. The Commission only had to show that
instant messaging fell within its general section 152 authority and that the conditions were
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ecosystems built on telecommunications infrastructure. On the con-
trary, the Act manifests an express desire to promote those goals.3 62
The most recent congressional action concerning broadband net-
works reinforces this interpretation. The American Recovery and Re-
investment Act, the massive economic stimulus package adopted in
early 2009, includes significant funding for broadband deployment.363
The grants are to be administered by the Department of Agriculture
and the National Telecommunications and Information Administra-
tion (NTIA) of the Department of Commerce, but the funding is con-
tingent on FCC open-access and interoperability mandates: "[The
NTIA Administrator], in coordination with the [FCC], publish the
non-discrimination and network interconnection obligations that
shall be contractual conditions of grants awarded under this section,
including, at a minimum, adherence to the principles contained in
the Commission's broadband policy statement (FCC 05-15, adopted
August 5, 2005) ."364 Rather than chastise the FCC for adopting the
Policy Statement and the Comcast Order, Congress incorporated the
Commission's policies as its own.
Because the public debate around the Telecommunications Act
of 1996 focused on the potential emergence of competition for local
telephone and cable-television services, as well as the removal of regu-
latory obligations on the successors to the AT&T monopoly,3 65 provi-
sions geared to those specific transitional situations garnered a
disproportionate share of attention and statutory text.366 Now that
those processes are mostly complete, the Act's core common-carrier
obligations and broader requirements such as sections 251 and 256
remain.
A conception of FCC jurisdiction over the Internet grounded in
sections 251 and 256 would address Justice Scalia's desire to check the
agency's ability to manipulate the scope of its authority.367 This ap-
proach would not, for example, support FCC imposition of rules regu-
lating online content or social policies such as 911 emergency services
related to the merger. See id. Rules covering instant messaging in other contexts would be
more difficult to justify.
362 See supra text accompanying notes 215-24. In the 1996 Act, Congress also directed
the FCC to forbear from enforcing any provision of the statute that it determines is not
necessary, if doing so would serve the public interest. See 47 U.S.C. § 160(a). This authori-
zation to shrink the Commission's authority mirrors the flexibility embodied in ancillary
jurisdiction to interpret statutory mandates more broadly.
363 See American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 6001,
123 Star. 115, 515.
364 Id. § 6001j).
365 NUECHTERLEIN & WEISER, supra note 6, at 69-74.
366 See HUBER ET AL., supra note 18, at 226-32, 256-58.
367 See supra text accompanying note 336.
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and access for law enforcement. 368 Nor would it allow the FCC to
impose obligations such as the broadcast flag or other digital-rights
management technologies. 369 None of these regulations would have a
sufficient nexus with the goal of promoting open interconnection to
fall under the statutory authority.370
2. Section 251: Interconnection
Section 251 (a) (1) requires telecommunications carriers "to inter-
connect directly or indirectly" with other carriers. 371 This broad man-
date, the first substantive provision Congress added to the
Communications Act in 1996, demonstrates a recognition of the cen-
trality of interconnection to competition in telecommunications.37 2
Without effective interconnection, network effects crowd out smaller
players. 373 Interconnection becomes even more important with the
rise of packet-data networks such as the Internet, built on the assump-
tion that traffic may flow between multiple networks dynamically to
reach its destination.37 4 Requiring a broadband-access provider such
as Comcast to offer effective interconnection with other networks, and
with application providers, is the contemporary analogue of intercon-
nection among telephone companies.
That section 251 (a) (1) covers telecommunications carriers only
is not an impediment to ancillary jurisdiction over Internet communi-
cations services. First, the reference in the statute to "indirectly" inter-
connecting indicates a broader understanding of interconnection
than just links among classic telecommunications carriers.37 5 Second,
the point of ancillary jurisdiction is that the statute admits of new obli-
gations to address new situations. The precise interconnection obliga-
tions that section 251 places on telecommunications carriers should
368 See, e.g., Crawford, Ambulance, supra note 7 (describing the FCC's extension of E911
and CALEA requirements, policies traditionally applied to telephone companies, to broad-
band-internet providers).
369 See Crawford, supra note 6, at 709-27; Werbach, supra note 17, at 58-68.
370 The FCC might, however, be able to address digital-rights management as a stand-
ardization exercise. See generally Daniel Benoliel, Cyberspace Technological Standardization: An
Institutional Theory Retrospective, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1259 (2003) (assessing standardiza-
tion policies and considering the proper body for standardizing the internet); Daniel Be-
noliel, Technological Standards, Inc.: Rethinking Cyberspace Regulatory Epistemology, 92 CAL. L.
REv. 1069 (2004) (arguing for a rule-oriented approach to setting technological standards
for digital-rights management); Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, Communications' Copyright
Policy, 4J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 97 (2005) (arguing that the FCC, despite its failure
with the Broadcast Flag Order, may have a role in setting technological protection
measures).
371 47 U.S.C. § 251 (a)(1) (2006).
372 See Werbach, supra note 54, at 1241-43.
373 See id.; Werbach, supra note 9, at 403.
374 See Werbach, supra note 54, at 1250-57.
375 47 U.S.C. § 251 (a)(1).
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not be mechanically extended to information services, lest the statu-
tory language become meaningless.
However, interconnection-like open-access requirements on
broadband-access services, of the kind the FCC proposed in the Policy
Statement, would be a distinct and appropriate means to achieve the
statutory goal. Only after the emergence of the broadband Internet,
and the FCC's decision to treat broadband access as an indivisible in-
formation service, were telecommunications carriers such as AT&T
and Verizon viewed as interconnecting as information-service provid-
ers.376 Just as the FCC in the 1960s saw the growth of unregulated
cable-television service potentially making FCC rules promoting local
broadcast content irrelevant,377 the FCC today could argue that un-
regulated broadband-access networks would make its rules promoting
interconnection irrelevant.
Section 251 (a) (2) directly ties interconnection obligations to
standards under section 256.378 The second half of section 251(a)
provides a clear mandate for the FCC to address broadband access. It
states that, in addition to interconnecting, telecommunications carri-
ers must "not ... install network features, functions, or capabilities"
that do not meet open interconnection standards set by the FCC.379
Comcast's proprietary, hidden, discriminatory traffic-management
techniques could be considered "capabilities" in violation of this pro-
vision. Under the ancillary-jurisdiction precedent, the Commission
need only conclude that adopting such a rule for Internet communi-
cations services is necessary to effectuate the statutory scheme for tele-
communications carriers.38 0
3. Section 256: Standards
Section 256 concerns the FCC's involvement in network manage-
ment and standards development. The section expresses a desire "to
promote nondiscriminatory accessibility by the broadest number of
users and vendors of communications products and services to public
telecommunications networks used to provide telecommunications
service."381 Specifically, section 256 directs the Commission to estab-
lish procedures "for the effective and efficient interconnection of pub-
lic telecommunications networks used to provide telecommunications
376 Previously, such operators were classified as telecommunications-service providers.
377 See supra Part III.A.
378 See 47 U.S.C. § 251 (a) (2).
379 Id.
380 See supra Part III.A.
381 47 U.S.C. § 256(a).
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service"38 2 and authorizes the Commission to continue its practice of
participating in telecommunications-standards processes.
38 3
As with section 251, this provision is limited on its face to tele-
communications networks. Section 256 goes even further, however,
by limiting its interoperability mandate to "public telecommunica-
tions networks used to provide telecommunications service"3 8 4 and ex-
pressly stating that the provision does not change the scope of
preexisting FCC authority.3 8 5 Section 256 cannot reasonably be read
to give the FCC the same authority to set standards and coordinate
network planning for information services as it does for telecommuni-
cations services. The FCC could not, for example, define the data
over cable service interface specification (DOCSIS) standards for
cable modems.38 6
On the other hand, section 256 states that one of its purposes is
"to ensure the ability of users and information providers to seamlessly
and transparently transmit and receive information between and
across telecommunications networks." 38 7 This statement recognizes
that information services travel via telecommunications networks. In-
terconnection standards for those networks can shape the informa-
tion-services markets that they support.38 8 Section 256(c) states that
Congress did not intend to reduce (or expand) the FCC's preexisting
authority.3 8 9 That would be the case if a broadband-access provider
could use its legal classification to avoid oversight of its behavior
entirely.
The FCC concluded in the Wireline Broadband Order that the Com-
mission could continue to oversee broadband reliability and inter-
operability, even though broadband access was now classified as an
information service.3 90 The Comcast Order extended that holding, fur-
ther noting that, "[e]ven assuming that Comcast's cable plant-based
Internet access network is not, when viewed in isolation, a 'public tele-
communications network,' it clearly interconnects with such
networks."3 9
1
382 Id. § 256(b) (1).
383 Id. § 256(b) (2).
384 Id. § 256(d). In fact, section 256 uses the term "telecommunications" nineteen
times. Id. § 256.
385 Id. § 256(c).
386 See CableLabs, DOCSIS Specifications, http://www.cablemodem.com/specifica-
tions/ (last visited Jan. 20, 2010).
387 47 U.S.C. § 256(a) (2).
388 See Kevin Werbach, Higher Standards: Regulation in the Network Age, 23 HARV. J.L. &
TECH. 179, 180 (2009).
389 47 U.S.C. § 256(c).
390 See Wireline Broadband Order, supra note 32, at 14,919, para. 120.
391 Comcast Order, supra note 2, at 13,039, para. 19.
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In a world where traditional public telecommunications networks
and newer Internet-data-transmission networks are pervasively inter-
connected, 92 it makes no sense to preclude the FCC's interoperability
efforts from affecting information services. The limiting language in
section 256 prevents the FCC from defining standards for private net-
works, or information services networks that do not interconnect with
the public-telephone network. It should not be read to preclude ad-
dressing Internet communications services.
4. Delegation
Tying ancillary authority over the Internet to sections 251 and
256 also cures the delegation problem with the FCC's current ap-
proach. 393 These provisions arguably represent the legislative direc-
tive and the "intelligible principles" to cabin the authority of the
regulatory agency. Unlike the FCC's view, in which the rules for infor-
mation services arise either from an inaccurate reading of section 230
or an abstract generalization of the "national Internet policy" that
Congress intended in the 1996 Act,3 9 4 this interpretation limits the
FCC's discretion according to the congressional language of two spe-
cific statutory provisions.
As an expert agency, the FCC is entitled to judicial deference for
its interpretation of its governing statute under Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.395 In finding congressional in-
tent to promote standards-based interconnection for the Internet as
well as the traditional telephone network, the FCC would be engaging
in such an activity.3 96 In United States v. Mead Corp., the Supreme
Court clarified that this judicial deference is appropriate only if Con-
gress first delegates legislative authority to the agency. 397 As discussed
above, Congress has granted the FCC such authority through the in-
terconnection mandates of the Telecommunications Act of 1996.398
This analysis also demonstrates why FDA v. Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp.399 supports the exercise of FCC jurisdiction. 400 In Brown
& Williamson, the Supreme Court rejected the Food and Drug Admin-
istration's claim that it could regulate cigarettes, because the Court
392 See Werbach, supra note 54, at 1261-66.
393 See supra Part 11.B.
394 See supra Part H.A.
395 467 U.S. 837, 842-45 (1984).
396 See Weiser, supra note 7, at 49-52.
397 United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 237 (2001) (precluding Chevron defer-
ence "where statutory circumstances indicate no intent to delegate general authority to
make rules with force of law"); see Weiser, supra note 7, at 50.
398 See supra Parts III.C.1-3.
399 529 U.S. 120 (2000).
400 But see Crawford, supra note 6 (invoking Brown & Williamson to argue against FCC
ancillary jurisdiction over the Internet).
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found that "Congress has directly spoken to the question at issue and
precluded the FDA from regulating tobacco products."401 The Court
refused to grant the agency Chevron deference where "based on
the.. . overall regulatory scheme and the subsequent tobacco legisla-
tion" congressional intent to bar the FDA from taking such steps
could be inferred. 40 2
In the present case, however, Congress considered and elimi-
nated statutory language from the Telecommunication Act of 1996
that would have barred FCC rulemaking authority over the In-
ternet. 40 3 The section of the Cox-Wyden bill dropped in the Confer-
ence Committee would have had such an effect.40 4 Had Congress
wished to limit FCC Internet rulemaking, it would have left that provi-
sion in the statute. Any analogy to Brown & Williamson therefore rests
on the overly speculative interpretation of section 230 attacked in Part
111.405
D. Finding Reason in the Communications Act
1. Critiques of Title I Authority
Some commentators criticize the ancillaryjurisdiction doctrine.
They argue that it should never have been adopted, or at a minimum,
it should be limited to situations directly analogous to Southwestern
Cable.40 6 Thomas Merrill and Kathryn Watts assert that section 4(i)
grants the FCC authority only on matters of internal procedure. 40 7
Jim Speta acknowledges some validity for ancillary jurisdiction but ar-
gues that its application cannot be extended to the Internet.40 8 Craw-
ford expresses concern that Title I authority over Internet-based
services such as VoIP will be used to impose unnecessary regulatory
impediments on new competitive entrants. 40 9
These critics overlook the impact of the 1996 Telecommunica-
tions Act. It is true that the original Communications Act prior to the
401 Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 160-61.
402 Id. at 160.
403 See supra text accompanying note 164.
404 See supra text accompanying note 164.
405 See, e.g., Crawford, supra note 6, at 734-35.
406 See id. at 730-35; Rob Frieden, Neither Fish Nor Fowl: New Strategies for Selective Regula-
tion of Information Services, 6 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 373 (2008); Speta, supra
note 7, at 24-26.
407 Thomas W. Merrill & Kathryn Tongue Watts, Agency Rules with the Force of Law: The
Original Convention, 116 HARv. L. Rv. 467, 517-19 (2002).
408 See Speta, supra note 7, at 24 ("If the section 4(i) grant of authority included legisla-
tive rulemaking, then the specific inclusion of these other substantive grants would be
redundant."). Speta favors interconnection obligations for Internet-based providers. Id. at
38-39. His concern is that such mandates must be specified in a new congressional delega-
tion, rather than imposed by the FCC under its existing authority. Id. at 16-17.
409 See Crawford, supra note 6, at 715-16.
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1996 overhaul granted the FCC legislative-rulemaking authority over
only three classes of companies: interstate common carriers, spectrum
licensees, and cable-television providers.410 However, that changed
when Congress revamped the statute. The 1996 legislation added sev-
eral new categories, including telecommunications and information
services. 411 It was only in 1996 that the statute expressly mentioned
information services; the predecessor category of enhanced services
was purely an FCC interpretive creation. 41 2 And the 1996 Act layered
rules on telecommunications providers, such as the section 251 inter-
connection mandate, on top of the more intensive but less broadly
applicable rules for common carriers. 413 "Telecommunications car-
rier" is expressly broader than "common carrier" under the 1996
Act.
4 14
The post-1996 Communications Act should be viewed through
the lens of the present, not the past. Congress may have intended a
narrow scope of FCC rulemaking authority in 1934, as Merrill and
Watts argue, 415 but that interpretation need not remain fixed indefi-
nitely. When the Supreme Court in Southwestern Cable endorsed an
interpretation of FCC authority contrary to the Merrill and Watts the-
sis, 41 6 Congress had ample opportunity to reverse the outcome. In-
stead, in the 1984 and 1992 Cable Acts, it added detailed regulations
for cable while leaving in place the questionable "housekeeping" lan-
guage of section 4(i).417 In the 1996 Act, it did the same, while rewrit-
ing significant portions of the original statute.418 Furthermore,
Congress chose in 1996 to create a new category, information services,
without specifying any substantive mandates for that category-if it
had intended information services as a regulatory null set, there was
no need for a separate bucket.419 Congress, despite not expressly con-
410 See Speta, supra note 7, at 24.
411 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 3(a) (41), (48), 110 Stat.
56, 58 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 203 (2006)).
412 See supra text accompanying note 36.
413 § 251, 110 Stat. at 61.
414 See 47 U.S.C. § 153(44) ("A telecommunications carrier shall be treated as a com-
mon carrier under this chapter only to the extent that it is engaged in providing telecom-
munications services .... )
415 See Merrill & Watts, supra note 407, at 515-19.
416 See United States v. Sw. Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 172-73 (1968).
417 Pub. L. No. 102-385, 106 Stat. 1460 (1992); Pub. L. No. 98-549, 98 Stat. 2779 (1984)
(codified in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
418 See 110 Stat. 56.
419 The history of congressional action and inaction around network neutrality is con-
sistent with this theory. Prior to the Comcast Order, several bills were introduced but not
adopted that would have expressly directed the Commission to enforce the Policy State-
ment. See David Hatch, Markey Offers Network Neutrality Alternative to Barton Bill, CONGRESS-
DAiLY, May 2, 2006. Since that action, and the election of a President who endorses
network neutrality, the momentum for such legislation has stopped. See David Hatch,
Boucher Opts for Talks, Not Legislation, on Net Neutrality, CONGRESSDAILY, Feb. 26, 2009. If
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templating the Internet, saw the need to define a distinct class for
data-processing services that ride on the network. The narrow theo-
ries of ancillary authority would consign that class to surplusage.
When considering the scope of the FCC's ancillary authority to-
day, the current statutory blueprint is the baseline. In 1968, the Su-
preme Court could only consider what FCC actions were necessary to
achieve its statutory mandates for common carriers and broadcasters.
Today, the FCC can act as necessary to carry out its functions regard-
ing notjust these categories, but also cable providers, telecommunica-
tions-service providers, and information-service providers. A view that
Internet-based services are beyond the reach of the Commission's au-
thority would undermine the modern statutory scheme. The FCC's
ancillary jurisdiction is not unlimited, as the broadcast-flag case
demonstrated, but neither is it so narrow as to be nonexistent. 420
Speta argues that assertion of ancillary authority over Internet-
based services "runs square into the central theme of the Telecommu-
nications Act of 1996 .... which was the introduction of competition
into all telecommunications markets." 421 If Internet-based services
such as VoIP compete with regulated telecommunications services, he
notes, the preferred solution under the 1996 Act is deregulation
rather than new regulation. 422 Although this argument may have
some purchase in the VoIP-regulation cases with which Crawford is
concerned, it is inapposite to the broadband-access scenario. 423 The
danger is not competition but regulatory arbitrage. If telecommuni-
cations carriers can escape from interconnection obligations by offer-
ing broadband service, section 251 becomes meaningless.
Competition does not change this outcome.
In essence, the critiques of FCC authority rest on the agency's
flawed assumption that such authority must flow from section 230.
Congress must affirmatively transfer some legislative authority to an
agency before that agency can act. 42 4 The view adopted by the FCC in
the Comcast Order and other decisions is that Congress did so when it
Congress, by not passing legislation to delegate authority over broadband access to the
FCC, intended to withhold such authority, the response to the Comcast Order should have
been moves to roll back the Commission's decision. Instead, the pattern is consistent with
the idea that Congress was concerned that the FCC would not act to address broadband
discrimination because it was unsure of the limits of its authority. This further distin-
guishes the FCC from the FDA scenario of Brown & Williamson. See FDA v. Brown & Wil-
liamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 160-61 (2000); Crawford, supra note 6, at 698.
420 See Broadcast Flag Order, supra note 282, at 23,566-67.
421 Speta, supra note 7, at 26.
422 See id.
423 See Crawford, supra note 6, at 715-16.
424 See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865
(1984); Thomas W. Merrill, Rethinking Article I, Section I From Nondelegation to Exclusive Dele-
gation, 104 COLUm. L. REv. 2097, 2100 (2004).
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told the FCC, in section 230(b) (1), "to promote the continued devel-
opment of the Internet. ' 425 Opponents of that view emphasize that
what Congress giveth in section 230(b) (1), Congress taketh away in
section 230(b) (2), which demands an Internet "unfettered by Federal
or State regulation. '" 426 There is ultimately no way to square these two
statements, which makes them ideal for selective quotation. 427
Grounding exercise of ancillary jurisdiction over the Internet in
the substantive-interconnection provisions of Title II avoids these
problems. The congressional directive is clear. Regulation of In-
ternet communications services gains continuity with the long history
of FCC rules to promote open interconnection. 428
2. The Disaggregated Alternative
The FCC retains the option to go back to the old regime of sepa-
rating regulated platforms from unregulated devices and content, al-
though such a course would be unwise. In theory, the Commission
could reverse its Wireline Broadband Order, reimposing the Computer III
non-structural safeguards on the telecommunications component of
broadband services offered by common carriers. The Brand X deci-
sion upheld the FCC's exercise of discretion in doing so as not arbi-
trary and capricious. 429 The courts have not yet passed on whether, as
a matter of law, integrated broadband offerings could be separated
into their telecommunications and information-services components.
While re-separating the components of broadband access is le-
gally permissible, it would represent an inferior alternative to the an-
cillary-jurisdiction approach. Legally separating broadband access
from its underlying telecommunications platform would simply reo-
pen the vexing issues that led the Commission down its current path.
Drawing lines between telecommunications and information services,
in a world where both use digital-packet data networks, is next to im-
possible. Even a few years ago, AT&T was able to transform its back-
bone traffic into packets to arbitrage around access-charge
requirements for telecommunications services. 430 Network operators
425 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(1) (2006).
426 Id. § 230(b) (2).
427 An interpretation that Congress intended for the FCC to "promote" the Internet
entirely by keeping it "unfettered by... regulation," id. § 230(b) (1), (2), would be inconsis-
tent with the history of section 230 and its relationship with the Communications Decency
Act, see supra Part II.A. Moreover, in the current broadband environment, it is impossible
to demarcate where the regulated telephone and cable networks end and the unfettered
Internet begins. The Internet is a network of networks run by network operators. Regula-
tion of the largest of those network operators is regulation of the Internet.
428 See Werbach, supra note 54, at 1249-50.
429 Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 981-82
(2005).
430 See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
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such as Verizon and AT&T are moving toward all-IP networks for busi-
ness and technical reasons. 431 If FCC rules distinguished between reg-
ulated and unregulated components of a broadband pipe, they would
be impossible to enforce.
The Computer III rules are problematic for other reasons. They
were cumbersome to apply and burdened legitimate service innova-
tion, because they required detailed filings. 432 The Commission could
attempt to reopen the proceeding and develop a less cumbersome set
of rules. However, it is difficult to see how the challenges involved
would be any easier today. The Commission could instead require
structural or functional separation among the offerings of broadband
access providers. Several telecommunications-policy scholars now ad-
vocate this approach, although so far it has enjoyed little political sup-
port in the United States.433
3. Institutional Competence
Ultimately, the question of the best regime comes down to institu-
tional competence. 434 Those concerned about regulatory capture and
the public-choice problems that administrative agencies face will pre-
fer an interpretation that strictly limits agency discretion to go beyond
explicit congressional mandates.435 Those who believe that the courts
applying general-purpose doctrines can effectively address the eco-
nomic challenges of interconnected networks will emphasize antitrust
mechanisms.436 And those who see continued viability of the expert-
agency model will prefer giving the FCC more room to maneuver.437
In practice, there may be only one option. Congress rarely makes
substantive changes to the Communications Act. Cable was not added
to the statute until 1984, sixteen years after the Supreme Court rati-
fied the Commission's ancillary authority, and not until 1996 was the
431 See Werbach, supra note 54, at 1292 (describing the growth of all-IP "next-genera-
tion networks").
432 See Werbach, supra note 17, at 24-25.
433 See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
434 See Weiser, supra note 7, at 49.
435 See Crawford, Ambulance, supra note 7, at 933-39; Lessig, supra note 5.
436 See PETER HUBER, LAW AND DISORDER IN CYBERSPACE: ABOLISH THE FCC AND LET
COMMON LAW RULE THE TELECOSM 201-02 (1997) ("The people's constitution is antitrust
law, developed in the courts under the short, broad mandate of the Sherman Act.");
Thomas W. Hazlett, FCC Should Leave Net Neutrality to Anti-Trust Courts, FIN. TIMES (Sept. 30,
2008) (on file with author), available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/O/bac78ca48ee8-1ldd-
946c-0000779fdl8c.html.
437 There is also room for hybrid models. Weiser, for example, proposes that the FCC
could superintend mechanisms that use post-hoc, antitrust-like standards or that involve
self-regulatory organizations. See Weiser, supra note 230, at 33-39; PhilipJ. Weiser, The Next
Frontier for Network Neutrality, 60 ADMIN. L. REv. 273, 318 (2008); Weiser, supra note 7, at
74-80.
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first substantial overhaul of the telecommunications provisions of the
Act adopted. 438
When Congress does get involved, the powerful competing inter-
ests tend to create a lobbying food fight, the results of which are un-
predictable and often problematic.43 9 As discussed above, there have
been rumblings for several years about a "fix" for the problems with
the 1996 Act, and numerous bills introduced, 440 but so far the critical
mass has been absent to overcome this political burden. It seems dan-
gerous to rely on Congress to amend the FCC's authority on a regular
basis to impose specific mandates for cutting-edge Internet-based
services.
Nor are the courts likely to take on a major role. In 1983, anti-
trust was the sword that broke up the mighty AT&T monopoly.441 A
quarter-century later, the Supreme Court has sharply limited the pros-
pects for antitrust litigation as a means to ensure the openness of
broadband-Internet platforms.442 In two recent cases, the Court re-
jected antitrust claims against incumbent local-exchange carriers. In
2004, the Court held in Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of
Curtis V Trinko, LLP that the FCC's comprehensive regulatory scheme
precluded assertion of an antitrust claim on a refusal-to-deal theory.443
Pacific Bell v. Linkline, issued in February 2009, extended that holding
for a price-squeeze claim by a broadband-access competitor.444 The
Court further concluded that AT&T had no duties toward competitors
under antitrust law because, "as the FCC has recognized . . .[,] the
market for high-speed Internet service is now quite competitive. '445
Rightly or wrongly, the Court views the FCC as the proper forum for
competitive issues arising out of the broadband-access market.446
The FCC must take seriously its responsibility for oversight of the
broadband market. And those who are concerned about the future of
438 See supra text accompanying note 411.
439 Cf William Safire, Op-Ed., Stop the Giveaway, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 1996, at A21 (com-
plaining about the impact of lobbying over the 1996 Telecommunications Act).
440 See supra note 419.
441 See United States v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131, 222-25 (D.D.C. 1982),
affd sub nom. Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983).
442 See Philip J. Weiser, The Relationship of Antitrust and Regulation in a Deregulatory Era,
50 ANTITRUST BULL. 549, 559-61 (2005).
443 Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398,
412-13 (2004).
444 See Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. Linkline Commc'ns, Inc., No. 07-512, slip op. at 9-10 (Feb.
25, 2009).
445 Id. at 8 n.2.
446 The Federal Trade Commission, another potential avenue for antitrust-like regula-
tion of the Internet-access market, is also poorly positioned to engage the competitive as-
pects of broadband networks, as opposed to their consumer-protections implications. See
Jon Leibowitz, Comm'r, Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, Broadband Connectivity Competition
Policy (2007), available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/leibowitz/V070000statement.pdf.
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that market must take seriously the legal foundations for FCC involve-
ment. A desired outcome is useless without a path to achieve that
outcome.
CONCLUSION
Twentieth-century regulation is holding back the twenty-first cen-
tury information ecosystem. For the first time, a universal platform-
the Internet-connects every kind of communications network. 447
Moreover, it is by design an open network, allowing any user to reach
any point, using any compatible device, running any software and de-
livering any content the user chooses.448 Innovation has flourished,
from the Blackberry to Facebook, iTunes to Google, Wikipedia to
Tivo, with the promise of even more extraordinary things to come. 449
The problem is that all those services and devices require one thing: a
network pipe to reach their customers. And those pipes, be they
wired or wireless, broadband or narrowband, copper or fiber, belong
to network operators who operate in a very different environment.
Without restraints, those network providers could destroy or pervert
the activities on top of their networks.
The regulatory structure for communications has not kept up
with the times. The FCC has pushed broadband-access networks, and
therefore the Internet, into the netherworld of information services,
without stopping to consider what that classification means. The
agency can salvage its role as the guardian of the public interest in
communications, but only if it reexamines that mission for a new cen-
tury. Promoting competition and innovation in telecommunications
today is tantamount to promoting competition and innovation on the
Internet. The FCC must assert its authority under the Communica-
tions Act to address this objective.
447 See Werbach, supra note 9, at 348-49.
448 See VAN SCHEWICK, supra note 10, at 1; Lemley & Lessig, supra note 9, at 931;
Werbach, supra note 9, at 400-02.
449 See VAN SCHEWICK, supra note 10, at 310-30.
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